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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS:
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: THE CHANGING 
TERRORIST THREAT
______________________________________________________________________________
On September 8, 2011, the American University National Security Law Brief  and the Law and Government Program at 
American University’s Washington College of  Law hosted a candid discussion on the changes throughout the American legal sys-
tem in the 10 years since the tragic September 11th attacks. The event featured a keynote address from Michael Leiter, Director 
of  the National Counterterrorism Center from 2007-2011, followed by a panel discussion with John Carlin, Principal Deputy 
to the Assistant Attorney General of  the Department of  Justice’s National Security Division; Ivan Fong, General Counsel at 
the Department of  Homeland Security; Stephen Vladeck, Professor of  Law at American University Washington College of  
Law; Ken Anderson, Professor of  Law at American University Washington College of  Law; and Dan Marcus, Professor of  
Law at American University Washington College of  Law. 
INTRODUCTION:
PROFESSOR JAMIE RASKIN: Good Day, everybody. My name is Jamie Raskin. I’m the 
director of  the Program on Law and Government and I’m delighted to welcome everybody here on 
behalf  of  the Program and also the National Security Law Brief, which is co-sponsoring this event 
with us. 
I will turn this over to my distinguished colleague in the Program on Law and Government, a 
Fellow in Law and Government, Dan Marcus, who has a distinguished career in public life and was 
the Chief  Counsel of  the 9/11 Commission, which is perhaps the most relevant experience he’s had 
to today’s talks. So please welcome Dan Marcus.
PROFESSOR DANIEL MARCUS: Thank you Jamie. Today’s program is co-sponsored by the 
National Security Law Brief, which is a young but vibrant publication on National Security Law here 
at the law school. The editor in chief  of  that publication who did a lot of  work on today’s program, 
can’t be here today for a very good reason. He’s starting an externship at the National Security Divi-
sion at the Department of  Justice and is currently in orientation there.
%XW,GRZDQWWRUHFRJQL]HWZRRWKHUKLJKUDQNLQJRIÀFLDOVRI WKH1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\/DZ%ULHI 
who are here today. Sally Gnat, who did a lot of  work on this program as well, and Vince DeFabo. 
Thank you both very much. I also want to say a word of  thanks to the indispensable Melissa de Beer 
RI WKH2IÀFHRI 6SHFLDO3URMHFWVZKRGLGHYHU\WKLQJXQGHUWKHVXQWRPDNHWRGD\·VHYHQWKDSSHQ
One other thing I want to mention before introducing our keynote speaker, is that the law school is 
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going to have a brief  memorial ceremony tomorrow morning at 10 am to honor and remember the 
victims of  the 9/11 attacks in the courtyard in front of  the law school. 
9/11 is one of  watershed events that has changed our view of  the world. Some would say it’s 
changed our view of  the world too much, but it certainly has changed our view of  the world. It has 
also changed the focus of  our government and our politics in the United States. The President and 
VHQLRUJRYHUQPHQWRIÀFLDOVLQFOXGLQJWKH$WWRUQH\*HQHUDODQGRWKHUVHQLRURIÀFLDOVRI WKH-XVWLFH
Department, now spend a lot of  time on national security and counterterrorism issues. We now have 
a completely reorganized and much larger intelligence community. We’ve got a new national security 
division in the Department of  Justice, and we have a whole new Department of  Homeland Secu-
rity just down the street. And in law schools throughout the country, not just here at WCL, national 
security and counterterrorism law have become an integral part of  the curriculum. 
Now we’re very fortunate to have as our keynote speaker today someone who is uniquely quali-
ÀHGWRDVVHVVWKHWHUURULVWWKUHDW\HDUVDIWHU0LFKDHO/HLWHUDV\RXFDQVHHIURP\RXU
speaker biographies, has a resume that’s even better than mine. It’s certainly more unusual. After 
KHJUDGXDWHGIURPFROOHJHKHVSHQWVL[RUVHYHQ\HDUVDVD1DY\SLORWÁ\LQJPLVVLRQVWRSROLFHWKH
No-Fly Zone in Iraq after the Gulf  War. Then he went to law school, where he became president 
of  the Harvard Law Review. Then he was a law clerk for Mike Boudin, an old friend of  mine, Judge 
Boudin, on the First Circuit, and Justice Breyer. Then he became a government lawyer, an Assistant 
U.S. Attorney, in the eastern district of  Virginia. 
In 2004, he became the Deputy General Counsel of  a commission. Not the 9/11 Commission. 
This is where I met Mike Leiter. I was General Counsel of  9/11 Commission, he was the chief  
lawyer for a commission with a really long name. It was sort of  the “how we screwed up the intel-
ligence on WMD in Iraq” commission. And then he became Deputy Chief  of  Staff  to the Director 
of  National Intelligence and also served in the important position as a guest speaker in my National 
Security Law class here. Then in 2007 he became the Acting Director of  the National Counterter-
rorism Center (NCTC), which he’ll probably tell you a little more about. And then in 2008 he was 
QRPLQDWHGE\3UHVLGHQW%XVKDQGFRQÀUPHGWREHWKH'LUHFWRURI WKH1&7&ZKHUHKHVHUYHGXQWLO
a couple of  months ago. And he’s one of  the few Bush Administration appointees, presidential ap-
pointees, who was kept on by President Obama, who perhaps was impressed that he had been, that 
Mike had been president of  Harvard Law Review. I’m sure there were other reasons. 
Okay, so with that, Mike is now, as the former director of  the NCTC, perhaps a little freer to say 
what he thinks about the terrorist threat to the United States than he was when he was in the gov-
ernment. And it’s a real privilege to have you here, Michael. 
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
MR. MICHAEL LEITER: Thank you. Folks, it’s a pleasure to be here and thank you Jamie 
and Dan for that introduction. Dan and I really do have a lot in common, probably more than he 
understands because people often ask me how I got into intelligence and national security. And I’d 
say, well I worked on this commission, and before I could even get out the name of  the commission 
they’d say, oh you were on the 9/11 commission? And I’d say, no it was another one. And they’d 
always go, oh. So Dan, I’ve actually stopped and now I’m just lying and saying I was on the 9/11 
Commission and taking credit for all of  your work. And I will also note that although Dan’s name 
for my commission is probably a catchier one, I think in legal terms that would be a bit like lead-
ing the witness on direct examination if  the name was “how did we screw up the intel for the Iraq 
WMD?” That’s where we came out in the end, Dan, but we couldn’t quite start there.
It’s a pleasure to be here. And this week, I’ve been speaking at a number of  places but this is 
special for me because I’ve known Dan for so long. Dan helped me so much in breaking into this 
DUHD$QGDOVREHFDXVHLW·VP\QHLJKERUKRRG,OLYHIRXURUÀYHEORFNVDZD\DQG,WKLQNIRUSHRSOH
who live in and around Washington, and for those who live in and around New York, two blocks 
from Ivan’s headquarters at Homeland Security, so close to the Capitol and the White House, so 
close to the Pentagon - yesterday I was at NYU and so close to site of  the World Trade Center - it is 
really impossible to recreate the sense of  that day. And I can’t try to recreate that for you but I ask 
that as we delve into some of  the legal and policy issues that sprouted over the past 10 years, it is un-
believably important not to dwell and never get past those events, but keep those events somewhat 
central in our thinking. Because that emotional gut-level response, again, is not a perfect line from 
the decisions we make afterwards, but it does help inform or explain some of  those decisions and I 
think it also helps us understand the ways in which government has to perform before an action in 
order to avoid the appropriate scorn of  the public if  the public is not protected. 
And if  you need another reminder, just this morning - I’ve obviously been watching some of  
the TV like everyone else - I’ll tell you that there’s a fabulous piece on the New York Times website. 
This is not a paid political announcement. There’s a fabulous piece with a series of  audiotapes that 
were recently release from various people involved with trying to track down the planes. Oh, maybe 
it was a paid political announcement because I see Eric Schmitt from the New York Times coming 
in right now. But it’s a fabulous way to bring yourself  back to that moment, much like the footage 
does to some extent. To bring yourself  back to the level of  confusion and the lack of  understanding. 
And that confusion and fear and lack of  understanding, of  course, continued on after the day and 
again guided lots of  our reaction. 
People talk about 9/11 as a sort of  awakening. I want to talk about three major topics today. 
One, I do want to talk about the threat. Second, I want to give you a sense, my perspective, and 
FXUUHQWRIÀFLDOVOLNH,YDQDQG-RKQ&DUOLQFDQJLYH\RXWKHLUVHQVHRI ZKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWLVGR-
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ing now, but I want to give you a sense of  how I think we tackled terrorism over the past 10 years. 
$QGKRQHVWO\,WKLQNWKDWLW·VSUHWW\WKHUH·VVLJQLÀFDQWFRQWLQXLW\LQKRZZH·YHGRQHLWRYHUWKHWZR
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQV$QGWKUHH,·PJRLQJWRRIIHUP\RZQUHÁHFWLRQVWKDW,KRSHWKHQOHDGWRDVHWRI 
questions from people other than Eric Schmitt, from the students and the faculty and the members, 
so we can delve into some of  the tough issues that are associated with terrorism today. So I’ve got 
about 25 minutes and then we’ve got as long as we have until Dan pulls me off. 
Before I go too deep, though, let me just toss out a few numbers and statistics so we remember 
in some ways, in simple ways, in the ways that numbers can explain but they don’t convey emotions, 
the costs of  9/11. That day, of  course, almost 3,000 people killed, more than Pearl Harbor. Out of  
that, we launched two major land wars. Depending on which numbers you look at, certainly more 
than 100,000 Iraqis killed, certainly more than – I would guess – 200,000 civilians killed total in those 
two wars. Now, more than 6,000 American soldiers killed in those two wars. Hundreds of  billions of  
GROODUVVSHQW$QGGHSHQGLQJRQKRZ\RXVOLFHWKHSLHZHQRZVSHQGPRUHWKDQELOOLRQD\HDU
on various aspects of  counterterrorism in the United States. 
In 2010, 10 years after 9/11, roughly 13,000 people across the globe were killed in terrorist 
incidents. About 70 percent of  those, more than 7,000, were killed by Sunni extremists, generally 
RUJDQL]DWLRQVDOLJQHGZLWKDO4DHGD7KHÀYHFRXQWULHVZKHUHWKH\ZHUHNLOOHGPRVWRIWHQWKHPRVW
were killed I should say, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and India. A pretty big drop off  from 
Somalia to India. And who is being killed by Sunni Islamic extremists? Other Muslims. Out of  those 
13,000 people who were killed by terrorists in 2010, about 340 were killed in the Western Hemi-
sphere. 340 out of  thirteen thousand. When I refreshed my recollection on that number it reminded 
me a little bit about our greatest generation, which obviously was a tremendous generation and we 
DOZD\VWDONDERXWÀJKWLQJRQWKH:HVWHUQ)URQWLQ:RUOG:DU,,TXLFNO\IRUJHWWLQJWKDWWKH6RYLHW
8QLRQORVWSHRSOHWRRXUHYHU\DQGWKDWWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RI ÀJKWLQJZDVRQWKH(DVWHUQ)URQW
And although we as Americans, I think appropriately, focus on the cost of  terrorism to us and to the 
Western Hemisphere, only 340 people out of  13,000 last year killed by terrorists were in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
Since 9/11, a total of  14 people have been killed in the United States by al-Qaeda-associated 
terrorists, or al-Qaeda-inspired terrorists. Fourteen. In the course of  this two-hour program, more 
Americans will be killed in car accidents than all the Americans killed by terrorists in the United 
States inspired by al-Qaeda in 10 years. Now I’m not trying to make pure equivalency there. But I 
think some of  these numbers are very important to put in perspective the threats we face. 
So, what is the threat? On 9/11 we faced a hierarchical organization centered in Afghanistan 
that obviously had not started in 2001; it had begun years before that with Osama Bin Laden declar-
ing a Fatwa against the United States and the West. Al-Qaeda attacked us of  course before 9/11. 
Attacked us in Kenya and Tanzania. Attacked us in Yemen. They at least claimed responsibility for 
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some actions in Somalia. But on 9/11 the picture clearly changed with the death of  3,000 Americans 
here. And at that point it changed both for us and frankly it changed for the organization that was 
al-Qaeda.
Although it was a hierarchical organization then, over the past 10 years, what launched those 
attacks in 2001 has, thanks to United States and Allied efforts, been not completely but at least in 
3DNLVWDQVLJQLÀFDQWO\UHGXFHGDQGWRVRPHH[WHQWGHFLPDWHG7KHUH·VQREHWWHUH[DPSOHRI WKDWRI 
the success that the United States had, then back on May 1st with the killing of  Osama Bin Laden, 
the only person who ever led al-Qaeda. And in my view the only individual who stood out from the 
organization in a way that spoke to a population and to some extent got past the concrete horror of  
al-Qaeda. And still, to some extent, to some symbolized something good even if  they weren’t sup-
porting his actions, but a man who was standing up against the West. Today, as I said, that al-Qaeda 
is decimated and that is a, in my view, a uniformly good thing. But of  course, as we decimated al-
Qaeda in Pakistan, al-Qaeda has gone on and has changed. And I keep referring to you, Eric, this 
is what happens when you show up for my speeches, if  you want some great writing on that from 
people like Eric and Tom Shanker - 10 percent right Eric? - and many others, talking of  the morph-
ing of  al-Qaeda. And it certainly has. 
We still have a hierarchy but that hierarchy is now distributed and there are now hierarchies in 
places that there weren’t on September 11th. The instability in Yemen has bred and helped foster an 
organization of  al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula which has attempted at least two attacks against 
the United States. My personal favorite, the Christmas Day bomber, followed by the attempt to blow 
XSWZRFDUJRÁLJKWVWUDYHOLQJWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV7KHRUJDQL]DWLRQNQRZQDV$O6KDEDDELQ6RPD-
OLDWKDWKDVDWWHPSWHGWRDVVRFLDWHLWVHOI ZLWKDO4DHGDDQGDOWKRXJKLW·VZRUNLQJUDQNDQGÀOHSURE-
ably does not have transnational views, its leadership certainly does. The organization al-Qaeda in 
North Africa that has attacked U.S. and Western interests and U.N. interest in Algeria and Mali and 
Mauritania. And of  course, what is most troubling to many Americans, the specter of  homegrown 
H[WUHPLVWVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV$OODJDLQZLWKWKDWVLJQLÀFDQWFDYHDWWKDW,·YHSRLQWHGRXWEHIRUH
that in 10 years we have tragically lost 14 Americans in the Homeland to al-Qaeda-inspired terror-
ism; but it is still a real threat. And certainly in 2009–2010, the United States experienced an uptick 
in that threat of  homegrown extremism, which has put many people on edge. Of  course the failed 
Times Square bomber, Najibullah Zazi who was driving from Denver to New York City likely to 
attack the New York City subway system, and many others that you’ve read about in the news . . . or 
haven’t read about in the news.
At the same time this is going on, there has been something else which has been happening, 
which I think in many ways is far more important than the trajectory of  al-Qaeda, and that is what 
we saw beginning earlier this year in the Arab Awakening. And what we saw was regimes throughout 
the Middle East falling, not to al-Qaeda as it once aspired to do, but instead to, with differing levels 
of  violence, relatively peaceful protest and the downfall of  regimes that have governed this region 
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and these countries for decades. And in that Arab Awakening we, again, did not see a strong hand 
from al-Qaeda; we saw just the opposite. We saw a level of  irrelevance to its ideology that, I think, 
KDVVLJQLÀFDQWO\XQGHUPLQHGWKHLGHDWKDWDO4DHGD·VLGHRORJ\KDVEURDGEDVHGDSSHDO
Throughout all of  this, the U.S. Government has changed constantly. And we can talk more 
about these threats in the questions. I don’t want to dwell there because frankly I think that’s where 
most people think every day. People generally read the paper and they have a sense of  what that 
WKUHDWORRNVOLNH,I \RXKDYHPRUHTXHVWLRQV,·PKDSS\WRÀHOGWKHP%XWZKDW\RX·UHOHIWZLWKDQ
RQJRLQJ\RXVWLOOKDYHDÁXLGSLFWXUH<RXKDYHDÁXLGSLFWXUHZKHUHDO4DHGD·VQRWJHWWLQJ3DNL-
stan, poses a risk to our troops in Afghanistan, poses a transnational threat, a network in different 
places of  the world. But ultimately al-Qaeda, in my view, is weaker. And what I mean by weaker, 
FRPSDUHGWRLVDO4DHGDLVOHVVDEOHWRLQÁLFWWKHW\SHRI GDPDJHLWGLGLQ6HSWHPEHU
Now that of  course is part because of  the enemy and it is part because of  what the U.S. Govern-
ment has done and that’s what I’d like to move to now.
So, what have we done? And I say “us” as in all of  you, because all of  you have also been part of  
the steps that the U.S. Government and the state governments and the local governments have done 
to combat this threat. I will put our actions into four basic categories. Now, I know these aren’t the 
perfect categories and I also know that they’re not the categories espoused in the President’s current 
strategy for counterterrorism, but I think they capture things in relatively clear ways that people, I 
hope, understand. First, there’s an offense. Second there’s a defense. Third, there’s a long game. And 
IRXUWKZHOOWKHUH·VNLQGRI WKHZLOGFDUGDUHDVDQGEXFNHWVWKDWGRQ·WTXLWHÀWLQWRP\RWKHUWKUHH
nice, neat categories. 
What have we been doing on offense? Well, I think quite clearly, and again I’m not here to de-
fend decisions made in prior administrations, but clearly to those who made the decision launching 
the wars certainly in Afghanistan and also in Iraq were designed to reduce the terrorist threat. But 
WRGD\DOWKRXJKFHUWDLQO\WKHÀJKWFRQWLQXHVLQERWKFRXQWULHVWKH86SUHVHQFHLQ,UDTLVUDSLGO\
diminishing and the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is slowly diminishing. And we are left with offense 
there. But that’s not the only offense I’m talking about.
I’m also, without getting indicted, talking about the offense which occurs when there are explo-
sions in places like Pakistan caused by U.S. strikes. I’m also talking about offense in the sense of  
domestically what the men and women of  the Department of  Homeland Security and the FBI do 
when they go out offensively to disrupt terrorists’ plots and arrest people. Having lived through 
two administrations, I have to tell you – and this might meet with chagrin from both sides – but not 
much has changed. If  anything – and President Obama, in my view, has been far more aggressive 
with the use of  targeted U.S. force – I personally believe, although there are probably those in this 
room who would disagree, that it has been done in accordance with International Law, U.S. Consti-
tutional Law, and traditions of  warfare. And in doing so, the United States Government has taken 
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RII WKHEDWWOHÀHOGWHUURULVWVZKRFDQQRWEHGHIHDWHGDQ\RWKHUZD\,·PÀQHZLWKGLVTXRWLQJWKH
phrase, the global war on terror. I think there are huge disadvantages to using that phrase. But what 
,·PQRWÀQHZLWKDQG,ZLOOÀJKWYRFLIHURXVO\IRULVWKHLGHDWKDWVRPHRI WKHSHRSOHZHDUHÀJKWLQJ
will not be persuaded, will not be arrested, will only be stopped from harming Americans when they 
are killed. This does not, I think, make me bloodthirsty; it makes me somewhat pragmatic. And hav-
ing spent the better part of  half  a decade now studying from as many perspectives as I can, those 
individuals who aspire to be in al-Qaeda or part of  al-Qaeda, I think that the proof  is in the pud-
GLQJ7KHUHDUHLQGLYLGXDOVRXWWKHUHZKRFDQQRWEHSHUVXDGHG7KHUHDUHHOHPHQWVRI WKLVÀJKWWKDW
require targeted violence, and that targeted violence, like many other uses of  targeted violence for 
the United States in the past, is a good one.
Domestically that gets a little harder. And I think many of  the current issues that we face today 
are involving the use of  offensive tools domestically. And again, I want to stress when I say offen-
sive tools domestically those are not the same tools. They are the use of  law enforcement. They’re 
the use of  intelligence tools within the United States. And I think many of  the opening questions we 
have in this society about what kind of  security we want still rest in that query. But in my experience, 
and again probably to the chagrin to some in this room, the Bush Administration and the Obama 
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQKDYHQRWVWUD\HGVLJQLÀFDQWO\IURPRQHDQRWKHULQWKHLUGRPHVWLFDFWLYLWLHV7KHUHDUH
very hard questions on the domestic front about when individuals who aspire to violence should be 
stopped. But largely, those decisions, Bush to Obama, those decisions were discussed in the same 
thoughtful way and pursued in the same thoughtful way. Some of  the tools were not the same, but 
the decisions really did come out from roughly the same place.
So that’s my short and dirty on offense. Now defense. And before I delve too deeply into de-
IHQVHOHWPHVWUHVVWKDWDOOWKHVHGRÀWWRJHWKHUWKH\GRQRWZRUNLQGHSHQGHQWO\'HIHQVLYHO\\RX
all know the defense. Who here hates taking off  their shoes when they go to the airport? Please 
pass my thanks to Janet Napolitano, Ivan, for telling me that I’m not going to have to do that in the 
future, and more importantly that some of  the people around me will not have to do that in the 
future. Who here who gets so annoyed and thinks it’s so stupid that everyone has to take their shoes 
off, remembers Richard Reid in 2001 attempting to blow up a transatlantic airliner with bombs in 
his shoes? Who here can’t stand the fact that they can’t get a big tube of  toothpaste in their carry-on 
when they’re traveling? Let’s just remember in 2006 al-Qaeda tried to use liquid explosives hidden in 
sports drink bottles to kill potentially more than 3,000 people.
These defensive pieces have their drawbacks; they certainly have their annoyances and they have 
more than that in some cases. But I think as a general matter again, and I can only say this from the 
perspective of  the Bush to the Obama administration, these defensive measures have been relatively 
FRQVWDQW$QG,FDQDOVRVD\ZLWKXWPRVWFRQÀGHQFHWKHVHGHIHQVLYHPHDVXUHVKDYHKHOSHGVWRSDW-
WDFNV<RXNQRZWKH\·UHQRWSHUIHFWDQGDJDLQWKDW·VZK\DOOWKHVHSLHFHVÀWWRJHWKHU%XWWKH\KDYH
PDGHLWPRUHGLIÀFXOWIRUYHU\LQQRYDWLYHEDGSHRSOHWRNLOO$PHULFDQVDQGRWKHUV/HW·VXVHWKHH[-
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ample of  the underwear bomber. Everyone says it was a failure. There are certainly aspects of  it that 
ZHUHDVLJQLÀFDQWIDLOXUH%XWSDUWRI WKHUHDVRQWKDWWKDWERPEGLGQ·WZRUNOLNHO\ZDVWKDWDO4DHGD
had to construct a weapon that got past these very defensive measures that we had taken. None of  
these measures will stop terrorism. These measures in combination will help reduce the likelihood 
of  a catastrophic attack. And that is ultimately what I believe the American people should demand 
of  their government. 
1RZIRUERWKRIIHQVHDQGGHIHQVH,GRQ·WZDQWWRVD\WKDWHLWKHURI WKHVHGRQ·WKDYHVLJQLÀ-
cant negative effects in other parts of  our efforts. In particular, the long game. Now what I mean 
by the long game is battling the ideology that attracts recruits to al-Qaeda. Do I think that strikes in 
Pakistan do not, to some extent, alienate Pakistanis, anger members of  the international community, 
and potentially drive some recruits to al-Qaeda? Of  course I don’t. Those are some of  the nega-
tive repercussions of  an offense. Do I think that when an individual who is trying to study in the 
United States to attain a law degree, an undergraduate degree, or to become an engineer who is com-
ing from Saudi Arabia or Jordan, whose name happens to have Mohammad in it and is subject to 
extensive screening for their Visa; do I think that that might not anger people and alienate them and 
make them feel less supportive of  what we consider American values? Of  course I don’t. Of  course 
I know that these actions can have some of  those negative repercussions. 
The question is not whether they have negative repercussions; the question is how you carefully 
calibrate your offense and defense with these long-term goals. Because I wish that we didn’t have to 
use strikes against terrorists. But if  someone has a better way of  stopping people who are plotting 
attacks against the United States when a host nation is unable to do so, please offer it up. I haven’t 
heard it in two administrations. When people, if  people really have a better way and a big bureau-
cracy to avoid any potential mistakes in screening Visas and the like, please tell me because I haven’t 
heard it in two administrations. This is not to defend any of  these systems and say they cannot be 
improved. But it is to say any actions we take will have some negative repercussions and we simply 
KDYHWRÀJXUHRXWKRZZHFDUHIXOO\FDOLEUDWHWKRVHDQGWU\WRPLWLJDWHWKRVHQHJDWLYHHIIHFWVZKLOH
pursuing the effects we’re trying to achieve with vehemence.
Which does lead me to the long game. And if  you ask me now what has been weakest in the 
U.S. efforts over the past 10 years, it is the long game in combating al-Qaeda’s ideology. I’ve got 
good news for you, though. Al-Qaeda has done really well combating its own ideology. If  you look 
at the, you can look at a variety of  polling numbers, but if  you look at polling numbers from 2001, 
2002, 2003, Osama Bin Laden was personally popular in a lot of  countries in the world. And in 
many of  these same countries, the populations were actually reasonably supportive of  suicide attacks 
DVDOHJLWLPDWHWDFWLFWRÀJKWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV7KHQFDPHSHRSOHOLNH=DUTDZLLQ,UDT7KHQFDPH
al-Qaeda in Aman, Jordan, killing innocent people at a Muslim wedding. As the stories of  al-Qaeda 
and al-Qaeda violence spread and was not just targeting the United States, more and more people 
WKURXJKRXWWKHJOREHDQGDJDLQWKLVLVFOHDUO\UHÁHFWHGLQDYDULHW\RI SROOLQJDO4DHGD·VLGHRORJ\
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Bin Laden as a person, al-Qaeda’s tactics have been increasingly rejected throughout the Muslim 
world. But that doesn’t solve your problem. There are always going to be those few that embrace 
this ideology. But as a general matter, we’re doing okay in the long game, not because of  what we’ve 
done, but because of  what al-Qaeda has done.
Our ability to shape that, again I apologize for the phrase but I still haven’t come up with a 
EHWWHURQHWKDWEDWWOHÀHOGRI LGHDVLVVRPHZKDWOLPLWHG7KH86·VFUHGLELOLW\HVSHFLDOO\WKHJRYHUQ-
ment’s credibility, is limited. How many people, I ask this all the time just because it’s fun for me, 
I’m not sure it illustrates much, but how many people here have taken a class in Islam? Now raise 
your hand if  you’re, sorry to do this and you can refuse if  you like, raise your hand if  you’re over 
40 and you took a class in Islam. That’s usually what happens. The United States Government, our 
leaders, our people, do not understand Islam. Here’s another question for the crowd. What are the 
two things you’re never supposed to discuss at a dinner party? Religion and politics. Try having an 
intelligent conversation about al-Qaeda. We’re very uncomfortable talking about these things. We 
don’t know the issues well. We don’t understand most of  the countries well where most of  al-Qaeda 
adherents are coming from. How many people have been to Yemen in this room? I don’t necessarily 
recommend it, especially right now.
A lack of  understanding; a lack of  comfort discussing these issues; the lack of  credibility that the 
United States Government has; the ways in which the United States Government generally com-
municates - white guys like me standing up in a press conference versus tweeting and Facebook and 
YouTube - all of  these factors, not to mention in my view the general lack of  funding to the organi-
zations in the United States Government who need to do this work as compared to the Department 
of  Defense, mean that the U.S Government remains, I think, less well postured than we should be to 
help defeat al-Qaeda’s ideology.
/DVWEXWQRWOHDVWRQWKHKRZDQGWKHQ,·PJRLQJWRJRWKURXJKWKHUHÁHFWLRQVTXLFNO\DQG,
actually will for once hit my 30-minute window I think. If I were a practicing lawyer I would go over 
VLQFH,JHWSDLGE\WKHKRXU6RUU\'DQ7KRVHVSHFLDODUHDVWKDWGRQ·WTXLWHÀWLQWRWKHRIIHQVH
GRQ·WTXLWHÀWLQWRWKHGHIHQVHGRQ·WTXLWHÀWLQWRWKHORQJJDPH7KLQJVOLNHFRPEDWLQJWHUURULVWDF-
cess to weapons of  mass destruction. Enabling our partner nations to combat terrorism because we 
FDQ·WGRLWDORQHDQGWKH\FDQGRLWEHWWHUWKDQZHFDQ$QGÀQDOO\WKHVWUXFWXUDOFKDQJHVWKDWZH·YH
had here domestically within our own system to make sure organizations like the National Coun-
terterrorism Center that I led, the FBI and Department of  Justice that John Carlin spent so much 
time with, Department of  Homeland Security that Ivan is a huge part of, all of  those pieces. And 
those pieces have gone actually remarkably well. I was with Graham Allison on Tuesday night and I 
mocked him incessantly because I think he’s frankly wrong, his predictions have been wrong about 
terrorists, the likelihood of  a terrorist WMD event. I think he’s been a bit of  an alarmist in this area. 
All that being said, nothing would change the game more than terrorists’ effective use of  biological 
or nuclear weapons. And this is a real and ongoing threat. And requires extensive resources both on 
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the offensive and defensive and intelligence sides.
Nothing that we do is more important than enabling partners. And enabling our foreign part-
ners, not to mention state and local partners, but most importantly - enabling our state, local, tribal 
and foreign partners to do the things that the U.S. Government can’t and shouldn’t do, and enabling 
them in a way that they are still doing their terrorism work, consistent with American values. And 
that I will tell you can be a tough line to walk, both on the domestic and on the foreign side. 
1RZORRNLQJEDFNLQWKUHHPLQXWHVKRZGR,UHÁHFWRQDOORI WKLV"+RZ·VLWJRQH"2YHUDOO,
really do think with some notable exceptions, it’s gone pretty well. Again, the numbers don’t help tell 
the story, but if  I had gotten this group together on September 12, 2001, and asked everyone how 
many more Americans will be killed in the United States in the next 10 years, I would put money 
on the fact that none of  you would say 14. I would guess none of  you would have said 140. I would 
guess most of  you would’ve said something closer to 1,400. And that is a remarkable success. With 
the enormous caveat that we still have to think about all the other costs that have been associated 
ZLWKWKHÀJKWWKDWZH·UHHQJDJHGLQ
6HFRQG,ÁDWO\UHMHFWWKHQRWLRQWKDW$PHULFDQ·VFLYLOOLEHUWLHVKDYHEHHQGUDVWLFDOO\LQIULQJHG
upon in the past 10 years. That is not to say, let me stress in the strongest possible terms, that things 
that I don’t support and things that I wish haven’t happened didn’t happen. But I think if  we look 
at the scale of  the things that happened, and we get past the bumper stickers, and we get past the 
DFFXVDWLRQVDQGORRNDWWKHIDFWV,EHOLHYHWKDWZHKDYHDVDJHQHUDOPDWWHUSXUVXHGWKLVÀJKWFRQ-
sistent with American traditions, the best American traditions. And we have a structure within our 
JRYHUQPHQWZKLFKKDVVWLOOLPSRVHGDVLJQLÀFDQWOHYHORI RYHUVLJKWWKDWDYRLGVPDQ\RI $PHULFDQ·V
fears. Now it’s really hard to convince people of  that because they think a lot more is going on than 
there is and that’s a good thing if  you’re a terrorist. I want the terrorists to think that. But if  you all 
think that the government is listening to all your phone calls and reading all your e-mails, if  only, our 
job would be a whole lot easier. Or I should say my former job would have been a whole lot easier. 
It simply isn’t happening. And bombastic accusations don’t help us have an intelligent conversation 
about those areas that are really open to sensible debate in my view. 
:HKDYHORVWDGHJUHHRI JOREDOVXSSRUWLQWKLVÀJKWRYHUWKLVSDVW\HDUVDQGWKDW·VUHDOO\D
problem. Now, some of  that global support, more of  that global support is there than people think. 
Because the ways in which intelligence organizations and security organizations continue to work 
WRJHWKHUHYHQZKLOHHOHFWHGRIÀFLDOVLQYDULRXVFRXQWULHVVD\,ZLOOÀJKWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV,ZLOO
never let them do this, please come help us with this, is remarkable. And what is often forgotten, is 
WKH86*RYHUQPHQWKDVGRQHPRUHDQG,XQGHUVWDQGWKHUH·VDÁLSVLGHWRWKLVWRRZDUVLQ,UDTDQG
Afghanistan, but the U.S. Government had done more to help defend countries in Western Europe, 
in the Middle East, in South Asia from terrorism than any other country on Earth. And we continue 
to do that daily. 
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7KUHHODVWTXLFNUHÁHFWLRQV,I \RXGLGQ·WNQRZLWEHIRUHWKHZRUOGLVDUHDOO\UHDOO\UHDOO\VPDOO
place. In 1994 after the Black Hawk Down incident, I think a lot of  Americans kind of  said, Soma-
lia, let’s get the hell out of  there and let’s not worry about it again. We don’t have the luxury to do 
that. We don’t have the luxury to treat Yemen as a punchline in a Friends episode that it was in the 
90s. Places like Yemen and Somalia really do matter to the security of  the United States. 
In the same way, and potentially even more importantly, we don’t have the luxury of  making 
the lead, it’s not even a luxury, we can’t if  we want to be secure even get remotely close, as I fear 
some have in some of  the public debate over the past two, three years, get close to marginalizing the 
American Muslim community. The American Muslim community is the single most important part 
of  helping avoid al-Qaeda’s ideology from taking root in the United States. They have fought it ve-
hemently since 9/11, they have continue to partner across faiths and within their own communities 
WRÀJKWDO4DHGD·VLGHRORJ\DQGZHFDQQRWUHPRWHO\OHWRXUVRFLHW\GULIWEDFNLQWR[HQRSKRELDDQG
treating anyone of  any race, ethnicity, or religion as somehow an outsider. It is abhorrent and I fear 
that it has made a comeback over the past couple of  years. 
Second to last. Technology’s great. I love my Smartphone; I love my iPad, also not a paid politi-
cal announcement. Technology can also bring terrible destruction. And technology is getting more 
and more accessible, and it will continue to get more and more accessible. As hard as it was for the 
United States to create an atomic bomb in 1945, it’s gotten easier. More and more countries have it, 
the materials are more widely available, the expertise is more widely available. Similarly for biological 
weapons. This is not the most likely occurrence that we will face. And we have some ways to defend 
against it. But should a nuclear or biological weapon be used by terrorists, all of  the niceties that we 
now talk about will go away very quickly.
/DVWEXWQRWOHDVWWKLVLVDJUHDWWLPHWRUHÁHFWEXWLWLVQRWLQP\YLHZWKHWLPHWRVWRS,W·VD
great time to address a lot of  the hard questions that quite amazingly we haven’t answered in 10 
years. What does our long-term detention policy look like? What kind of  domestic security presence 
do we want? And so on and so on and so on. But if  people think that it’s all over, it certainly isn’t 
RYHUJOREDOO\$QGOHW·VMXVWFKDQJHDIHZWKLQJVWKDWWKH86*RYHUQPHQWKDVGRQHDQGUHÁHFWRQ
how different this conversation would be had in 2006 even one of  those planes had been blown out 
of  the air. Let’s change a few pieces of  defensive work or failure on the operator’s part and say Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab did blow up a plane over Detroit on Christmas 2009. Let’s just imagine now 
that some of  the work that the FBI had done and DHS did and the New York Police Department 
did hadn’t worked and Faisal Shahzad had blown up that car in Times Square. That shouldn’t drive 
all of  our decisions. But it has to inform the discussions we have 10 years later because the evolution 
of  terrorism has continued. It did not begin and end on 9/11 and it’s not going to begin and end in 
2011. I very much thank this group for listening and most of  you staying awake, and I’m very happy 
WRÀHOGDVPDQ\TXHVWLRQVDVZHFDQVTXHH]HLQ
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DANIEL MARCUS: Thank you very much. I think we have time for just a few questions before 
going onto our panel discussion. I’ve got a couple but I’m going to cede my question opportunity 
to join, so does anyone have a question they’d like to ask. Step to the mike if  you would. And if  you 
could tell us who you are?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What would you say is more important to our long-term efforts? De-
feating al-Qaeda or separating the Taliban from the current Afghan administration?
MICHAEL LEITER: I actually think it’s very important for us to distinguish the two. It doesn’t 
mean that both are not enemies of  the United States. But I think our goal, with respect to both, has 
to be quite different. I think our goal for al-Qaeda has to be defeat. We cannot live, we can live but 
we can’t live happily and the way we should and Americans should expect us to live, with an ongoing 
transnational threat from al-Qaeda. They’re not a group with whom we will negotiate.
Not being an expert on the Taliban, I think that the Taliban’s interests, there’s at least a good 
argument to be made, but the Taliban’s interests are quite different from al-Qaeda’s. It’s not that 
the two are not related but is there a way to ensure that the Taliban does not support transnational 
terrorism? I’m am hopeful there is and if  there is, then I think your approach to the Taliban imme-
GLDWHO\EHFRPHVGLIIHUHQWIURPDO4DHGD%HFDXVHWKHYHU\GHÀQLWLRQRI DO4DHGDLVDJOREDOZDURI 
terrorism. Al-Qaeda, no matter what we do, will not back down in that effort. The Taliban, again, 
is linked, similarities and ideology, but I think their pursuits are not necessarily hand-in-hand, even 
though al-Qaeda’s leadership, we have to remember, has of  course pledged their own buy-out to 
Mullah Omar in the Taliban. And certainly if  you’re on the ground in Afghanistan, the Taliban is 
DWWHPSWLQJWRNLOO$PHULFDQVROGLHUV7KDW·VZKRZH·UHÀJKWLQJ%XWWKDWLVWRPHVWLOOGLIIHUHQWIURP
an organization plotting, planning and trying to execute attacks against the Homeland or outside of  
the region. The fact is we’ve lived with the Taliban for a long time before 9/11. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This kind of  relates to what you said. Since I’ve learned that policies 
have changed, at least in my view drastically since 9/11, I wonder if  it’s gone up to a size that is sim-
ply unsustainable? I guess my question is, is there any way to make the intelligence community size 
PRUHFRVWHIÀFLHQWEXWVLPLODUO\PRUHHIIHFWLYH"
0,&+$(//(,7(5:H·UHJRLQJWRÀQGRXWDUHQ·WZH">/DXJKWHU@,VWKHUHDQ\ZD\WRPDNHWKH
86*RYHUQPHQWPRUHHIÀFLHQWDQGVPDOOHU"7KHDQVZHULV\HV7KHUH·VQRZD\WKDWDIWHU\HDUV
WKDWWKHUHDUHQ·WLQHIÀFLHQFLHV:H·YHSRXUHGDORWRI PRQH\LQWRWKLV7DNHWKHPRVWHIÀFLHQWWDNH
*RRJOH,JXDUDQWHHWKHUHDUHLQHIÀFLHQFLHVDW*RRJOHWKHUHDUHLQHIÀFLHQFLHVHYHU\ZKHUHZKHQ\RX
get big organizations that have grown rapidly. The DNI, the Director of  National Intelligence, is Jim 
&ODSSHUQRZDQGWKH&RQJUHVVKDVHQRUPRXVFKDOOHQJHVLQIURQWRI LW:KLFKLVKRZGR\RXÀQG
WKDWLQHIÀFLHQF\ZLWKRXWGRLQJZKDWZHGLGDIWHUWKH&ROG:DU":KLFKZDVGHFLPDWHWKHLQWHOOLJHQFH
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community. We lost a complete generation of  people, we lost huge capabilities and we didn’t have 
the capacity to address a lot of  global threats. 
'RLQJWKDWLVQRWJRLQJWREHHDV\,WKLQNWKHUHLVVXIÀFLHQWVXSSRUWRQWKH+LOOIURPP\H[SHUL-
ence and in the administration. And I think in ongoing administrations that this won’t be hollowed 
out but it is going to take some - you’re probably going to hit the bone on some of  the cuts. I think 
that can be done intelligently and the real issue is less how are we going to cut the budget, and what 
Americans and what the Congress and what the administration expects its government to do? How 
good do you want us to be? I’m sorry, how good do you want them to be? It’s not us anymore. 
$QGLW·VJRLQJWRWDNHKDUGFKRLFHV,VRQH$PHULFDQNLOOHGE\WHUURULVWVZRUWKELOOLRQD\HDU"
Five? Ten? I don’t want to turn this into an actuarial game but there are going to be hard choices 
about that because we’re going to have to take increased risk. We’re not going to cover all the same 
places. We’re not going to address all the same domestic threats because we’re not going to have the 
same people. And as long as the American people understand the risk that they’re buying, and the 
Congress understands that risk, and then backs up the operators after the fact, let me hammer that, 
if  Congress buys into it and supports the operators after the fact, then I think that we can get to a 
relatively good place. There are a lot of  “ifs” in what I just said. 
DANIEL MARCUS: Here’s my last quick question and it may not be such a quick answer. You 
didn’t say much in talking about offense and defense about the intelligence value of  our program of  
interrogating detainees. And the - it’s an area where I think - I wonder what you can say at this point 
about your view as to whether the value of  that program outweighed the costs to the United States 
in terms of  undermining our values and alienating world opinion? And how we’re doing now, now 
that we don’t seem to be capturing a lot of  people. We’re killing them instead. Are we missing out on 
a real intelligence opportunity? That’s an easy one.
MICHAEL LEITER: Yes. Where to start? First, this is one of  those areas where I think it is 
important to at least attempt, and again, not to decide any question, but bring ourselves back to 
2001. 9/11 was a lighting bolt in a lot of  ways. And one of  the ways in which it was a lightning bolt 
is it illuminated a very murky landscape for a split second and then it went away. And I don’t know 
how many people have ever been outside in a lightning storm and you kind of  don’t know your sur-
roundings. And then a lightning comes up and you see lots of  shapes. You’re not really quite sure 
what you’re seeing, but you saw some things over there and some things over here. It turns out that 
if  you then were able to make it daytime and have perfect illumination, you’d see a really different 
picture. And I think immediately after 9/11, we didn’t know what was out there. 
And, not only did we not know what was out there in the form of  al-Qaeda, but we weren’t well 
SRVLWLRQHGDWWKDWSRLQWWRÀQGRXWPXFKDERXWDO4DHGD:HGLGQ·WKDYHWKHKXPDQVRXUFHVWKDWZH
have today in Pakistan and Yemen and elsewhere. We didn’t have the Signals Intelligence infrastruc-
ture to collect some of  their communications. We didn’t know how they operated; we didn’t know 
126 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 2, No. 1
their hierarchy; we didn’t know their tools. And we couldn’t simply turn on the light. What we were 
going to do was illuminate that with individual candle after individual candle after individual candle. 
And Dan, as you know, doing that takes a lot of  time. It takes years to build up that base of  under-
standing.
One of  the pieces that was undoubtedly important in those early days to try to jump start, to at 
OHDVWJHWDÁDVKOLJKWLI QRWDVSRWOLJKWZHUHLQP\YLHZLQWHUURJDWLRQV1RZOHW·VSXWWKDWLQDFRUQHU
for a second and distinguish the basic idea of  interrogating. We interrogate people all the time and 
LW·VMXVWÀQH)%,LQWHUURJDWHVWKHP'+6LQWHUURJDWHVWKHPVWDWHDQGORFDOLQWHUURJDWHV7KHQ\RX
have the question of  how you interrogate them. So we can’t just dismiss the idea of  interrogation 
being valuable. Of  course interrogation is of  value.
And then we have to cut out some things that are really independent of  what the specialized 
interrogations of  al-Qaeda senior level operatives were. Abu Ghraib was not that. No one in their 
right mind should defend anything about what happened in Abu Ghraib. And Abu Ghraib was 
not what was going on with senior al-Qaeda operatives in certain programs. Some of  the abuses in 
Guantanamo were not that program. 
Now, then you get to that tough question of  the tools that were used in that specialized inter-
rogation program. And the one, I have my personal views about whether or not they constitute 
torture based on my reading of  various legal documents and my personal gut feeling, and the fact 
that I was waterboarded when I was in Seal school in the Navy. Didn’t really enjoy it. In my view, 
the unfortunate, the most unfortunate piece about this was that our three branches of  government 
did not come to a common understanding. Frankly in my view some elements of  our branches of  
government stood back and let the executive branch do things that after the fact they felt awfully 
uncomfortable with when they were illuminated in the light of  public discourse. And I think that’s 
the unfortunate piece. That’s not the only unfortunate piece. That’s the systemic failure, that we have 
a system of  checks and balances. And then the executive branch can think something but there were 
opportunities for other elements of  the U.S. Government to weigh in before the fact and say, you 
know what? This one’s making me queasy and I want to stop this. Would they have been success-
ful? I don’t know. But it certainly didn’t happen to the extent I think in a well functioning system it 
should have.
$WWKHWLPHLQWHUURJDWLRQVZHUHRI VLJQLÀFDQWYDOXH$VZHOHDUQPRUHDQGXVHGLIIHUHQWWRROV
WKH\EHFDPHRI VLJQLÀFDQWO\GHFOLQLQJLPSRUWDQFH'RHVRXUFXUUHQWVWUXFWXUHPDNHLWPRUHGLIÀ-
cult to have people in custody and interrogate them than it was before? Yes. To me that’s one of  the 
open questions: what are our long-term detention plans? I don’t think we have a clearly enunciated 
policy there. 
So for me, there’s value in interrogations. I don’t have a sense, Dan - I really mean this - I don’t 
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have a sense whether or not those techniques were the ones that got the good stuff. I think perfectly 
reasonable arguments can be made on both sides. I will tell you in my experience talking to experi-
enced interrogators from different nations, and here in the United States, I think there is a perfectly 
good argument that some of  that information if  not all could’ve been obtained through alternative 
means. 
DANIEL MARCUS: Okay. I think we’d better quit now, now that we gave you the easy one. 
Thank you again very much and please join me in thanking our keynote speaker, Michael Leiter.
PANEL DISCUSSION: COMBATING THE EVER-CHANGING TERRORIST THREAT
'$1,(/0$5&86,·PJRLQJWREULHÁ\LQWURGXFHRXUSDQHOLVWVZKRVHELRJUDSKLHV\RXKDYHLQ
\RXUPDWHULDOV$QGOHWPHLQWURGXFHÀUVWHYHQWKRXJKKH·VQRWJRLQJWRVSHDNÀUVWVRPHRQHZKR
is a surprise to most of  you today. Lisa Monaco, who is the new Assistant Attorney General for the 
National Security Division at the Justice Department, got summoned to a White House meeting at 
WKHVDPHWLPHDVWKLVSDQHOODWH\HVWHUGD\DQGVRZHKDYHDWHUULÀFUHSODFHPHQWIRU/LVD1DPHO\KHU
alter ego, John Carlin, who is the principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the National Se-
curity Division and the Chief  of  Staff  for the National Security Division. He had a similar job until 
recently as Chief  of  Staff  for Bob Mueller, the Director of  the FBI, who I guess is going to con-
tinue as Director of  the FBI for two more years in this unique twelve-year term. And I think, John, 
this new job should be pretty easy for you, because the National Security Division is much smaller 
than the FBI. So if  you can run the FBI, you can run the National Security Division. John is a career 
lawyer at the Justice Department. He started out in the honors program at the tax division prosecut-
ing tax cheats. Then moved on to be an Assistant U.S. Attorney, before going to the FBI. 
Next to John is Ivan Fong, who was a colleague of  mine in the Clinton/Reno Justice Depart-
ment. It seems like ages ago. Ivan was a Deputy Associate Attorney General at the Justice Depart-
ment when I was there. We have two presidents of  law reviews here today. Ivan was the president of  
the Stanford Law Review and then was a law clerk for Judge Abner J. Mikvaon on the D. C. Circuit, 
and then or Justice O’Connor. Then he went to Covington and Burling, and then he went to the Jus-
tice Department. Then he went to G.E., where he was a senior lawyer and then was the chief  legal 
RIÀFHUDW&DUGLQDO+HDOWKEHIRUHFRPLQJEDFNWR:DVKLQJWRQZKHUHKHEHORQJVWREHWKHJHQHUDO
counsel of  the vast and sprawling Department of  Homeland Security.
I won’t spend much time on our other two panelists because they’re very well known in this 
EXLOGLQJ7KH\DUHWZRRI RXUGLVWLQJXLVKHGSURIHVVRUVZKRWHDFKDQGZULWHSUROLÀFDOO\LQWKH
national security law area. Ken Anderson. I guess I’m a late in life academic. Ken is a mid-career 
academic and Steve Vladeck is a young academic. Ken teaches international law and business law 
courses here and writes extensively on issues relating to the law of  war and national security law. 
128 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 2, No. 1
He’s a fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Brookings Institution. So he’s got both ends cov-
ered. Steve Vladeck teaches constitutional law, federal courts and national security law here. He was 
a law clerk for Judge Marsha S. Berzon on the 9th Circuit and Judge Rosemary Barkett on the 11th 
&LUFXLWDQGLVDOVRDSUROLÀFZULWHULQWKHVHÀHOGV
Okay, with that introduction, I think we’re going to start with Ivan. We’ll have time for questions 
ZKHQWKHSDQHOLVÀQLVKHG
MR. IVAN FONG: Thank you very much Dan. If  it’s okay, I’ll sit with the panel because I 
hope that this will be truly a panel and not a series of  speeches and that we can have some dialogue 
among the panel and obviously with the audience. First I want to thank again Dan, but also the 
American University Washington College of  Law for hosting this program. It’s a real privilege to be 
here. Dan and I, as he indicated, have known each other for a long time and in fact, everyday when 
,ZDONLQWRP\RIÀFH,KDYHDSODTXHWKDW,JRWZKHQ,OHIWWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI -XVWLFHDQG'DQZDV
the acting Associate Attorney General at the time. And so his name and his signature greets me ev-
ery morning. I also want to thank the other panelists for being here. I think this is both a timely and 
an important topic for us to talk about, which is combating the ever-changing terrorist threat and its 
legal and policy issues. 
What I thought I would say in my sort of  ten minutes to start is really to set the stage in a way 
VLPLODUWRWKHZD\0LNH/HLWHUGLG%XW,·PJRLQJWRWDNHDVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWDSSURDFK,·OOVWDUWÀUVW
with my bottom line. Bottom line up front, which is that in terms of  the changes that have occurred 
in the legal and policy realm in this area, I think a lot has changed. I think the United States has 
PDGHVLJQLÀFDQWSURJUHVVLQVHFXULQJWKHKRPHODQGIURPWHUURULVPVLQFHWKHDWWDFNV%XWWKDW
said, much work remains. The threats persist and continue to evolve. I think that’s my jumping off  
point which is how do we as a country, how do our legal institutions, how do the people who are on 
the front lines and the policy makers, adapt to an evolving threat? And my basic proposition, and 
this is I think appropriate for a law school audience, is that it’s not so much about changes in the 
law, per se. I think we all are familiar with things like the USA PATRIOT Act and the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which created the Director of  National Intelligence and 
the NCTC. The Detainee Treatment Act, the Military Commissions Act. There have been a lot of  
laws, including the law that created the Department of  Homeland Security. But to me, it’s really the 
institutions and processes that have made the difference and that are the key to our continuing effort 
to adapt. So let me unpack a little bit what I mean by that. So, starting with institutions, I think the 
PRVWVLJQLÀFDQWFKDQJHDQGLW·VWKHRQH,·PWKHPRVWIDPLOLDUZLWKLVWKHFUHDWLRQRI DQHQWLUHO\QHZ
cabinet department. 
Ten years ago the Department of  Homeland Security did not exist. In 2003 it stood up, bring-
ing together 22 different federal agencies. It is now formed around seven operating components. I 
always get asked what DHS does each day. I think to this day, there are still people who don’t quite 
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XQGHUVWDQGRUNQRZKRZWKH\DOOÀWWRJHWKHUVRLI \RXUHPHPEHUQRWKLQJHOVHUHPHPEHUWKHVH
seven agencies. So it’s the three former immigration and naturalization service agencies. So, what 
was formerly INS. So, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protec-
WLRQV&3%DQG&LWL]HQVKLSDQG,PPLJUDWLRQ6HUYLFHV&,67KH\GRWKHLPPLJUDWLRQEHQHÀWVWKH
visas, the asylum applications and the like. Plus, FEMA, Coast Guard, TSA and the Secret Service. 
So when you think about the breadth and the complexity of  those agencies and the over-arching 
missions, and so just to recap again, DHS’s missions, obviously, it’s the preventing and combating of  
terrorism, which is the cornerstone mission. But also securing and administering the border; admin-
istering and enforcing our immigration laws; securing cyber space, which I’ll talk a little bit more 
about later; and something that I think is a relatively new concept, but which I think is as important 
as the offense and defense and long game that Mike Leiter referred too, and that is to promote and 
insure resiliency in response to disasters of  all kinds. And again, it’s something that I’ll come back to.
:KDWDERXWSURFHVVHVDQGSURFHGXUHV"7RPHWKHPRVWVLJQLÀFDQWFKDQJHVKDYHFRPHLQWKH
DUHDRI LQIRUPDWLRQVKDULQJ6R\RX·OOUHFDOOWKDWRQHRI WKHVLJQLÀFDQWÀQGLQJVRI WKH&RP-
mission was the stove piped nature of  the intelligence community, the law enforcement community, 
WKHÀUVWUHVSRQGHUFRPPXQLW\VWDWHDQGORFDOV:HKDYHPDGH,WKLQNGUDPDWLFLPSURYHPHQWVLQ
not just the actual sharing of  information, but the culture in which those actors engage. To me, it’s 
YHU\VLJQLÀFDQWIRUH[DPSOHWKDW'+6KDVIXVLRQFHQWHUV7KHVHDUHFHQWHUVZKHUHIHGHUDOVWDWH
local law enforcement come together to share intelligence information. The suspicious activity re-
port initiative to standardize how state and local law enforcement collect and share information. The 
new national terrorism alert system. So you recall the old color-coded system has now been replaced 
E\DPXFKZHWKLQNEHWWHUV\VWHPWKDWLVPXFKPRUHVSHFLÀFPRUHFRQFUHWHLQWKHIRUPRI ZKDWLV
the threat, what actions people can take and most importantly, has an automatic sunset provision, so 
that we are not constantly under some very high state of  alert. 
The Secretary of  Homeland Security is fond of  saying that homeland security begins with home-
town security. And that means that in terms of  information sharing, we all play a role. You’ve prob-
ably seen signs across Amtrak or elsewhere that talk about “if  you see something, say something.” 
If  you look at the plots here in the U.S. that have been disrupted, most of  them have involved some 
member of  the public who alerted somebody in law enforcement. And I could go on. The inter-
QDWLRQDOHIIRUWVDWVKDULQJLQIRUPDWLRQDQGIRUPDOL]LQJWKRVHUHODWLRQVKLSVKDYHEHHQVLJQLÀFDQWDV
well. So to me, that is a huge change and a huge improvement. 
A second area we’re all familiar with, aviation security, I think a lot of  the changes occur behind 
the scenes. A lot of  them have to do with the screening of  passenger identities before people board 
the plane. Establishing global aviation security standards. Increasing the security at our ports as well 
as surface transportation. Using risk based methods to do a better job of  screen and identifying po-
tential threats. Making better use watch lists and more intelligent use to avoid over extending in that 
area. You may have read about plans to increase the trusted traveler program. Which would again 
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EHPRUHULVNEDVHGDVRSSRVHGWRRQHVL]HÀWVDOO7KHODVWWKLQJ,·OOVD\EHIRUH,LGHQWLI\WKHVRUWRI 
handful of  legal issues that I see down the road, has to do with cyber security. It’s, I think, the area 
that I, one of  the areas that I am most concerned about. In part because it is so new, it presents 
PDQ\GLIÀFXOWOHJDODQGSROLF\LVVXHVDQGEHFDXVH,WKLQNZHDUHSUREDEO\PRUHYXOQHUDEOHLQWKLV
area than we should be. 
DHS has done a lot. We have rolled out a cyber intrusion detection system for the .gov domains. 
So DHS’s role is to protect the government networks. We have stood up a national cyber security 
and communications integration center that integrates threat information and shares it and distrib-
utes it. We have entered into groundbreaking agreements with the defense department to share per-
sonnel information resources so that we can be truly partners in this effort. We have also established 
a cyber incident response plan. We have conducted exercises. So there are a lot of  things that we are 
doing, but as I said, it’s an area that remains a challenge for us in the government. 
The issues, I’ll start with the obvious, I think the over arching theme of  the program, evolv-
ing threats. I mentioned cyber, I would add to that something that Mike Leiter mentioned, which is 
the issue of  home grown violent extremists and how to address that threat. Soft targets and the use 
of  improvised explosive devices. So, very small-scale attacks that require very little planning, don’t 
provide much advance notice, and so to the extent that we have better intelligence, we have better 
capabilities, those really are directed towards the larger scale plots that take often years to develop. 
It’s the smaller ones that can cause just as much psychological harm that I think is something that we 
need to continue to adapt too. 
And that leads me to the point that I had mentioned earlier about resilience, and something that 
Mike Leiter mentioned, and that is the extent to which we have as a society had to be prepared, that 
we’re not going to be perfect. That we cannot guarantee 100 percent security. And that given enough 
time, any system is going to have some failure and that we need to prepare ourselves for some kind 
of  attack or incident. Not something we want, we will do everything possible to prevent, but we as a 
country need to be resilient, we need to bounce back, we need to go on, we need to continue to do 
the things we are doing, rather than let an incident really bring us down as a country. And so I think 
that’s a long-term very important goal that requires a lot of  work. 
Other legal issues. I mentioned earlier a focus on prevention. And I think prevention is very 
different from our traditional law enforcement approach, which is a crime or some wrongdoing oc-
curs and we have well-established procedures and capabilities for responding. Preventing is and can 
EHPRUHGLIÀFXOWDQGRQHDVSHFWWKDW'+6LVSDUWRI DQG,·PVXUHZH·OOKHDUDERXWRWKHUVIURPWKH
FBI and Department of  Defense side, is the concept of  pushing out our borders. That the physical 
ERUGHUVDFWXDOO\RXJKWWREHDODVWOLQHRI GHIHQVHQRWDÀUVWOLQHRI GHIHQVH$QGVRVRPHRI WKH
work that we’ve done in cooperation with our foreign partners to insure better visa screening, to get 
more intelligence, all is about this concept of  pushing our borders out. And that, of  course, raises 
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legal questions about extraterritorial [ph] applicability, about the rights of  non-U.S. citizens and U.S. 
citizens who are abroad, and the importance of  partnership agreements.
The third major issue, of  course, is privacy and civil rights and civil liberties. I think it is an area 
that not only we, the lawyers, but the Department as a whole, is deeply committed to protecting. We 
KDYHDVWDWXWRULO\FUHDWHGGHGLFDWHGRIÀFHIRUSULYDF\DQGVHSDUDWHO\IRUFLYLOULJKWVDQGFLYLOOLEHUWLHV
7KRVHLQGLYLGXDOVDVZHOODVP\RIÀFHDUHLQYROYHGLQDOOPDMRUGHFLVLRQVDQGZHKDYHYHU\IXOOUR-
bust, frank conversations about how proposed courses of  action may affect privacy and civil liberties 
and civil rights. And they’re very much taken into account in the decision making process. 
Last couple ones I’ll mention. The role of  the private sector, we haven’t talked much about that 
so far. Much of  our infrastructure is in the hands of  the private sector. Certainly our cyber infra-
VWUXFWXUHEXWDOVRFKHPLFDOIDFLOLWLHVWKHHOHFWULFJULGWKHZDWHUVXSSO\RXUÀQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV
And so we at DHS have as really one of  our important missions, the outreach and the coordination 
with the private sector and in turn, our message to the private sector, which is that you have to be 
SUHSDUHG,WKDVWREHDFRUHFRQÀGHQFHWKDW\RXUHVSRQG\RXSUHYHQWMXVWLQWKHVDPHZD\WKHJRY-
HUQPHQWGRHVWRGD\6RWKDWLVDVLJQLÀFDQWFKDQJHDVZHOO,WUDLVHVOHJDOLVVXHVJRLQJIRUZDUGDERXW
FULVLVUHVSRQVHVSODQVGRLQJH[HUFLVHVDQGGULOOV,W·VHOHYDWHGWRWKH&KLHI ([HFXWLYH2IÀFHU&KLHI 
5LVN2IÀFHU%RDUGRI 'LUHFWRUOHYHO6RLWLVDVLJQLÀFDQWLVVXHIRUWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU
And then I’ll close with a note that may be closer to home and that is to talk about the future 
and the way we adapt is by having great talent. And one of  the things that I have talked, as I go 
around speaking on this topic, is the need for law students such as you, and law schools such as 
WCL, to really promote and invest in a homeland security law curriculum. It’s something that can 
start with very basic courses in constitutional law, administrative law, international law and then 
building block courses in areas that are more specialized in homeland security such as maritime law, 
maybe even aviation security law, or cyber security law, national security law. And then I would envi-
sion a capstone course called homeland security law. And we actually piloted for our lawyers, our 
new lawyers, a course on homeland security law. And so every lawyer that comes to DHS, within 
WKHLUÀUVW\HDU\HDUDQGKDOIZLOOJRWKURXJKDZHHNORQJVHVVLRQRUVHPLQDUWKDWZLOOLQWURGXFHWKHP
to all the different parts, not only of  what DHS does, but some basic legal issue spotting sessions 
WRKHOSWKHPVHHWKHLQWHJUDWLRQRI KRZWKHSLHFHVÀWWRJHWKHU6R,ZRXOGHQFRXUDJH\RXWRWKLQN
about that, to consider offering more sequence in this area. Maybe you do already. But that combin-
ing the academic study with an internship or a practical experience at DHS. So my closing pitch is 
to consider DHS as a place to work. We have an honors program. It’s a great program and we need 
talent like yours. We need the best and the brightest to help us solve and help us address the emerg-
ing threat that we face. 
DANIEL MARCUS: Thank you Ivan. John?
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MR. JOHN CARLIN: I think Ivan’s next job might be as the dean of  a homeland security law 
program. I want to keep my remarks brief  in part because others have already touched on them and 
also to encourage the dialogue among the panel. I thought the name of  the topic for this discussion 
was interesting. The “Ever-Changing Terrorist Threat.” I think in talking about an ever-changing 
terrorist threat, which is an apt description of  what we are facing, it leads inevitably to the need for a 
ÁH[LEOHDQGQLPEOHOHJDODQGSROLF\VWUXFWXUHWKDWFDQUHVSRQGDVWKHWKUHDWFKDQJHV,ZDQWWRUHÁHFW
a little bit on some of  the changes that have occurred since September 11th. Talk big picture about 
where we see the current threat and future threats down the line, but do so while keeping in mind 
the necessity for the changing threat picture to be mirrored by the government’s ability to be equally 
ÁH[LEOH
Since September 11th, I think there has been a sea change, and I agree with Ivan and Mike that 
the U.S. government, in a way that would have been impossible to anticipate really, as a young pros-
ecutor starting out prior to 9/11, really brought all tools to bear. And that means traditional prosecu-
tor law enforcement tools, diplomacy, the skill sets of  the authorities, and the intelligence commu-
nity and the military. And now, in a way that just in part takes the legal and authorities change, but in 
SDUWWDNHVWLPHIRUFXOWXUDOFKDQJHWRRFFXUWKHUHUHDOO\LVDXQLÀHGDFURVVWKHJRYHUQPHQWHIIRUWRQ
the terrorism front to prevent, disrupt and deter. In a way that I’m not sure all could have foreseen. 
And there have been, as a result, numerous successes and lives saved because of  terrorist attacks 
that but for these changes would have occurred. In that sense, I think what Mike said towards the 
conclusion of  his remarks is true. It would be hard to predict how few lives have been lost since 911, 
when you think about the climate that we’re in right after 9/11. 
Yesterday the national security division had an event commemorating, for those of  us in the 
division, where we were since 911. We heard from the prosecutorial and FBI team that prosecuted 
the Moussaoui case. In listening to it, it really brought you back to that time and the sense of  fear 
and uncertainty. The shock that it had occurred. In part they played clips from each of  the victims 
and they had a visual graphic up of  the 3,000 victims. And they talked about how when they were 
presenting the case, in the death penalty phase of  the Moussaoui trial, they really tried and made a 
conscious decision, no matter the resources to go without a prosecutor and FBI agents and treat 
every single one of  those victims as a victim of  a homicide and give them the same type of  process 
and discussion that they would if  they had gotten each of  those cases individually. And that is still 
is ringing in my head as I talk to you today and reminds us of  why it is that we made these changes, 
but also that we can’t rest on the changes that we’ve made. We need to continue to analyze the threat 
and we need to continue to move and change and we can’t be a situation again where we make the 
change after the fact, the threat. 
I think the core al-Qaeda remains a capable organization that we treat with all seriousness and so 
there’s been much talk about the degraded capability and I won’t disagree with that assessment. But 
from most of  us dealing day in and day out at the FBI, at the CIA, at the Department of  Homeland 
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Security, core al-Qaeda is still at the front of  the mind every day when you’re in the morning brief-
LQJVDQGKHDULQJWKHWKUHDWSLFWXUHIRUWKDWGD\7KHDIÀOLDWHV:KDW,WKLQNZHDUHVHHLQJLVDFKDQJH
IURPZKHUHZHZHUHPRUHIRFXVHGVD\ÀYHVL[\HDUVDJRRQORQJWHUPFRUHDO4DHGDSORWVWKDW
ZHUHFRPSOH[DORQJWKHOLQHVRI 6HSWHPEHUWKQRZZH·UHSD\LQJHTXDODWWHQWLRQWRDIÀOLDWHJURXSV
like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), or Al Shabaab, who have declared their allegiance or 
partnerships with core al-Qaeda, and other groups who may not have entered into a formal partner-
ship or declared allegiance, but have similar goals or aims and cross-fertilizes some of  the core al-
Qaeda groups. The multiplicity of  those groups makes our job more complex, although the hopeful 
advantage is that we’ve disrupted that long term complex strategic planning from core al-Qaeda. 
The other development that both Mike and Ivan touched on is the growth of  home grown 
violent extremists. In part that’s fueled by success in disrupting core al-Qaeda in causing this multi-
plicity of  actors, but it’s also fueled, no doubt, by the Internet and the unique role that it now plays 
in a way that messages that take place in a basement overseas in an international setting, are reach-
ing our teenagers and our citizens here at home. And if  you are inspired, it provides the stability for 
GLUHFWFRPPXQLFDWLRQ7KDW·VYHU\GLIÀFXOWWRGLVUXSWEHFDXVHLW·VRFFXUULQJRQWKH,QWHUQHW,WKLQN
when you look at some of  the plots that have either succeeded or we’ve disrupted, the Fort Hood, 
or disrupted plots to blow up a Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, several plots to at-
tack military recruitment centers inside the U.S. There’s been an unprecedented level over the last 
couple of  years of  terrorism disruptions inside the U.S. and a large number of  those disruptions are 
of  home grown violent extremists. We’re seeing the number of  people in that category grow and I 
would expect, as we’re looking ahead at future threats, that that’s one that will continue to grow, we’ll 
need to continue to monitor, and we’ll need to continue to come up with new ways to disrupt. 
I completely agree with Ivan as to the threat of  cyber and that when it comes to the cyber threat, 
DOWKRXJKWKHUHKDVEHHQVLJQLÀFDQWSURJUHVV,NQRZWKH)%,KDVVWDUWHGWKLVJURXSWKH1DWLRQDO
Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, to bring together all the intel and law enforcement and mili-
tary groups who are operational to focus each time there’s an attack on attribution. With cyber, one 
RI WKHJUHDWGLIÀFXOWLHVWKDWRXUOHJDOIUDPHZRUNKDVQRWNHSWXSZLWKDQGZH·UHZRUNLQJWRGRVR
and similarly in our policy framework, is that at the outsight of  a cyber attack you don’t know who 
WKHDFWRULV$QGVR\RXUHDOO\QHHGWREOHQGWKHUHVRXUFHVDQGÀJXUHRXWLVWKLVWKHWHHQDJHKDFNHU
acting in the basement? Is this an organized criminal group? Is this a foreign nation state? Is this a 
terrorist actor? Is this some type of  hybrid? A terrorist group leveraging an organized criminal group 
or leveraging a group of  social hackers? And quickly try to determine, after the attack has occurred, 
and this is more in Ivan’s lane, but similarly, we haven’t hardened our infrastructure in the cyber 
arena to a place where most of  us in government would like. And it’s an area where the threat will 
continue to grow, our reliance on those systems continues to grow and our ability to respond needs 
to keep pace. 
I want to talk a little bit about structural changes that have occurred since 9/11. I think when it 
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comes to combating the terrorist threat, great strides have been made in part by changing the legal 
infrastructure. I won’t go into long detail about the changes in the PATRIOT Act and FISA, but 
there has been success at tearing down the wall that existed between law enforcement and intelli-
JHQFH,·YHVHHQWKDWÀUVWKDQGERWKDWWKH)%,DQGDWWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI -XVWLFHZKHUHWKHROGFRQ-
struct that one needed to keep law enforcement investigations separate from intelligence that based 
part on legal interpretation and existing law, but also on policy determination, has really changed. 
And now the presumption is to share and groups are integrated and disrupting through the criminal 
justice system is one tool to prevent, disrupt and deter terrorist attacks. But that’s what it is, a tool in 
the arsenal. The most important thing is the objective of  disrupting the attack and sharing the intel-
ligence so that you can bring other tools to bear as well. Whether they’re diplomatic, or military, or 
immigration authorities through DHS. 
In addition to the legal change, there have been structural changes. My new position, in the 
Department of  Justice’s National Security Division, only came into existence in 2006 as a result of  
a recommendation from the WMD commission. And what it was really designed to do is to take 
advantage of  the changes in the law and to place together the prosecutorial experience so that the 
former counterterrorism and counterintelligence prosecutors that had worked within the Depart-
ment of  Justice with the intelligence professionals, who are not in the criminal division under the old 
structure of  the Department of  Defense; and put them together in the same division and have the 
focus be on the goal rather than the authorities that you’re using to achieve that goal. That structural 
change, and other structural changes, like the creation of  the NCTC and the Department of  Home-
land Security, they also helped, I think, to accomplish the cultural change. Where individuals who 
used to work apart grew used to working together and to bringing the different - and it’s impor-
tant because all of  us are operating under the rule of  law. But it’s a different set of  legal authorities 
and administrative authorities and you become expert in your way of  looking at how to analyze a 
problem based on the legal authorities that you have and the resources that you can bring to bear. 
And until these structural changes occurred and then the concomitant changes in the culture, it was 
GLIÀFXOWWREULQJWKRVHGLIIHUHQWYLHZSRLQWVWRJHWKHUWRVROYHWKHSUREOHPWKDWZHIDFHZKLFKZDV
preventing the attack. 
I want to talk a little bit about outreach because while you’re doing this, many of  the terrorist 
threats for the past ten years, the violent extremist threats that you’re facing, are threats that affect 
the Muslim and Arab communities inside the United States and other related communities. And 
so an important part, I think, while this transition was occurring, in maintaining a goal of  prevent-
ing the attack, is doing outreach to these communities. As part of  that, within the Department of  
Defense, the civil rights division as brought nearly 800 cases since September 11th against individu-
als who sought to violate the civil rights of  members of  the Arab and Muslim communities. It is 
important to maintain that dialogue and that vigorous enforcement. In terms of  privacy and civil 
rights, I know it’s a mark of  pride for the national security division at the Department of  Defense 
DQGIRUWKH)%,WKDWWKHFRPPLVVLRQLQLW·VÀQGLQJVRQHRI WKHUHDVRQVWKH\FKRVHRUUHFRP-
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mended, to keep the domestic intelligence function within the Department of  Defense was a recog-
nition of  the department’s long standing adherence to the rule of  law and it’s record of  oversight in 
that regard. We bear that as both a mark of  pride and also part of  our day-to-day responsibilities in 
executing our authorities and in helping the other members of  the intelligence community and our 
partners exercise their authorities. 
,QVKRUWFRQFOXVLRQDOWKRXJKZHFDQUHÁHFWDQGWDNHSULGHLQWKHSURJUHVVWKDWZH·YHPDGHZH
need to remain focused on the forward threat and we need to remain critical of  the efforts that we’re 
taking in case they need further reform. 
DANIEL MARCUS: Okay, we’ll turn to the academics now and Professor Anderson.
PROFESSOR KEN ANDERSON: Well thank you and I’m delighted to take part in this. I’m 
going to be very brief  in part because Michael Leiter has already given the background to much of  
what it is that I’m focused on here. And second, the other presentations have gone to parts that I am 
simply not going to address, particularly the domestic part, the homeland security, these elements. 
So, with an understanding that this is deliberately a very narrow part of  all of  this, I’d like to talk 
for just a minute or two about the question of  the use of  force outside the United States. So what is 
the role of  the U.S. using force in wars and other kinds of  things - but on an outside of  the United 
States basis. 
Let me start this by going back to something again that Mike Leiter framed, which is speaking 
DVDEXVLQHVVODZSURIHVVRUDQGVRPHERG\WKDWWHDFKHVFRUSRUDWHÀQDQFHWKHUHDUHPRPHQWVZKHUH
the right question is framed around what does the additional dollar of  spending get me in terms 
of  being able to sell one more unit of  iPods? One more iPhone? One more iPad? There are also, 
similarly, points at which it makes sense to ask how much does this additional dollar of  spending 
purchase in terms of  security or American lives saved or other people’s lives saved or any of  these 
questions. And that is that there are moments in which it makes sense to be speaking purely on the 
margin. That is sort of  smoothly rising or smoothly falling curves by which an additional unit results 
in some other additional unit. There are limits to that however, which is that the nature of  many 
risks is that they are not smooth. They’re not continuous and there isn’t any relation between the 
additional units spent and what you actually gain in the margin. And that has very important bearing 
on the question of  security and the use of  force abroad, because most of  the use of  force abroad is 
not really about that kind of  marginal - we spend one more increment, we get this additional incre-
ment of  something else. Most of  it is actually premised on the idea that it’s a huge, huge mistake, 
in terms of  the long game that Mike Leiter, to wind up thinking about your activities from a relent-
lessly tactical serial standpoint. 
One of  the lessons I took after 9/11 was that the American people were not saying to the lead-
ership that they should calculate how much additional spending we have to have in order to save an 
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American life and tell me whether that’s greater than the amount that’s necessary in order to save 
them from being struck by lightning. That, I don’t think, was the question or the demand or the 
desire of  the American people at that point. It was a strategic expectation that in some way or other 
the game would be changed in some much more fundamental way. And I believe that the American 
administrations heard that and went out and pursued the use of  force abroad on exactly that kind 
of  expectation. So what was described as two land wars in Asia, plus part of  that and also separate 
from that, a massive counter-terrorism effort that apart from the land wars themselves, are all part 
of  an effort to get beyond the idea of  what is on the one hand, a crucial function of  government, 
to wake up every morning and say how do I ensure that there is not going to be an attack at the 
airport? How do I ensure that the plane is not going to come down? How do I ensure all of  these 
things on a serial day by day by day basis? But that cannot win at the strategic level if  the expectation 
is that people don’t want to live that way, where that’s the primary focus of  their lives.
In that regard, then the question becomes what are the larger strategic elements? And which I’m 
only focused on the question of  use of  force, I’m leaving aside larger questions of  ideology and lots 
of  other things. What I think ten years on that we have learned from a strategic standpoint is that 
regime change turns out to be very very important if  you’re talking about a regime that as a regime 
winds up harboring non-state terrorists, actor groups, al-Qaeda and related forces. Regime change 
in failing states turns out to be marvelously easy because there’s not a lot of  regime to change. And 
at that point, then the question of  use of  force in a land war becomes, what do you do afterwards? 
6RDVZH·YHVHHQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQDUHHIIRUWWKHUHEHFDPHFRXQWHULQVXUJHQF\2QWKHJURXQGÀJKW-
ing over the very long term. And then a very large strategic question about what do we need to do 
in order to achieve our overall aim that I think is really to change the nature of  the security equation 
from the standpoint of  the United States. 
We have told ourselves at various points that that requires that we establish democracy, the rule 
of  law, other sorts of  institutional changes in Afghanistan. I believe that at some level. I also don’t 
think that it’s achievable at another level. And I think that that’s the basic strategic encounter that 
the Obama administration had to deal with as it came in and made it’s review of  America’s wars. 
And I believed that it’s reached something like that same conclusion. Desirable things are not al-
ways achievable things and that one has got to separate the question about what would be good in 
Afghanistan from the question of  what is minimally achievable that will be within the U.S. strategic 
interest as far as counter-terrorism goes? 
Now at this point I’m sounding almost exactly like Vice President Biden. And I think that that 
probably is a fair description of  the strategic posture regarding Afghanistan of  the Obama admin-
LVWUDWLRQDQGLW·VRQHWKDW,WKLQNLVSUREDEO\ULJKW1DPHO\WKDWZH·UHQRWJRLQJWRÀ[$IJKDQLVWDQ
much beyond what it is now. That we are going to wind up withdrawing from counter-insurgency 
and that we are going to focus on counter-terrorism. And that the focus on Afghanistan will become 
the question of  how do we wind up preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven once again 
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for al-Qaeda or for other groups that might succeed it? And whether that requires a stable govern-
ment, I think, is probably an open question in the minds of  much of  the leadership, because I’m not 
sure that that can actually be achieved. 
The question then becomes what happens in Pakistan and I will set that aside because I don’t 
know the answer and I don’t think that anyone else does either. What we do see, however, is the 
fragmentation and the proliferation, the movement of  groups as they both seek new safe havens 
in other places. Nigeria is next on the list. So in other words, as they move out further into other 
places, then the question is what groups should be pursued and in what means? And again, leaving 
aside all other possibilities let me end this by saying one thing about use of  force. We have decided 
that the primary tools of  our projection of  force are going to be at the level of  special operations, 
are going to be at the level of  the use of  drones, of  JSOC, of  counter-terrorism teams, of  CIA and 
what we can roughly describe as intelligence driven uses of  force. I believe that that is actually right, 
given where we are today and there will be a big question about where those things are used, what 
their relationships to other kinds of  tools of  the projection of  national power. Lots of  questions like 
that that I won’t attempt to answer. 
But I do think that we’re going to see, at least as far as the use of  force, that those are going to 
be the tools that are the thin tip of  the spear. The emphasis there ahs to be on intelligence driven, 
meaning that one has to have the intelligence in order to be able to use the new technological mar-
vels that we are coming up with. One of  the things that I think is vastly not understood about the 
nature of  the drone campaign that goes on in Pakistan and in Afghanistan today is the extent to 
which that depends upon having created, over a number of  years, a genuinely serious intelligence 
effort on the ground that is able to feed targeting information directly to who is it that you are 
identifying to target. That’s a very long process in which the drone strike is the last kinetic moment 
of  a very very long intelligence build up before that. If  we’re going to wind up using those kinds of  
uses of  force in other places, we’re going to have to contemplate the intelligence efforts necessary to 
make those work. 
Let me say one last thing about this which is I believe that we are, from a legal standpoint, in the 
position of  having to develop new rules at both the domestic level and to integrate them with what 
our understanding of  international law is on the question of  what I have here described as intel-
ligence driven uses of  force. I don’t think that our legal rules at the domestic level and the way that 
ZH·YHGHÀQHGFRYHUWDFWLRQDQGWKHZD\WKDWZH·YHGHÀQHGDFFRXQWDELOLW\IRULWRYHUVLJKWUHSRUWLQJ
WKRVHWKLQJVWUXO\ÀWWKHSLFWXUHRI ZKDWLWORRNVOLNHWRGD\:KLFKLVQRWPRVWRI WKHWLPHJHQXLQHO\
covert, but merely deniable. And in a world in which our uses of  these kinds of  force are really only 
GHQLDEOHDWDSROLWLFDOOHYHOIRUSXUHO\ÀFWLRQDOSXUSRVHVWKHQWKHGLVFXVVLRQRI ZKDWZHQWRQKRZ
we inform about that, the nature of  accountability and oversight has actually got to be re-examined. 
$QGWKHQÀQDOO\WKHTXHVWLRQRI WKHLQFUHDVLQJLQWHJUDWLRQRI PLOLWDU\DQG&,$RSHUDWLRQVLQ
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this, I believe, will also require some further re-examination of  the legal rules for those things. Dan, 
I’ll leave it there. 
DANIEL MARCUS: Thank you Ken. Steve?
PROFESSOR STEPHEN VLADECK: Thanks. So I have the lucky or unfortunate privilege of  
JRLQJODVW:KLFKPHDQV,JHWWKHVPDOOHVWDXGLHQFHEXWDOVRWKHFKDQFHWRUHÁHFWRQHYHU\ERG\HOVH
,·PJRLQJWRWU\WREHEULHI VRZHFDQJHWWR4	$,UHDOO\MXVWKDYHWKUHHTXLFNSRLQWVWRPDNH
Well, I hope they’re quick. And I’m sort of  provoked by something that Michael Leiter said. I think 
I wrote this down right. I think he said, “civil liberties have not been drastically infringed upon over 
the past decade.” And since I’m the crazy leftie up here, I think it’s probably worth asking what he 
meant by civil liberties and whose civil liberties he was referring to. The reason why I want to start 
here is because even though our topic today is the changing nature of  the terrorist threat, I think it’s 
important to realize that whereas we’ve spent much of  the last hour and a half  talking about mis-
takes that have been bureaucratic, and diplomatic, and from a political standpoint, and how things 
KDYHEHHQÀ[HGDQGLPSURYHGDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVUHDUUDQJHGDQGZKROHGHSDUWPHQWVVWRRGXSIURP
non-existence, there are other mistakes that we’ve made over the past ten years. Mistakes that are not 
about which department is responsible for which action, but mistakes that are about individual civil 
liberties. And I think as we’re considering the changing nature of  the terrorist threat, we also have to 
consider the changing nature of  that threat as it relates to individual rights and accountability. And I 
think that’s been what, at least in my mind, we haven’t spent a lot of  time on so far today. So forgive 
me, I’m going to spend a few minutes on it. 
So let me sort of  start with the proposition that civil liberties have not been drastically infringed 
XSRQRYHUWKHSDVWGHFDGH6RÀUVW,WKLQNRI FRXUVHWKDWGHSHQGVRQZKRVHFLYLOOLEHUWLHVZH·UH
talking about. For non-citizen, well let me put it more bluntly, for twenty to thirty-nine year old 
Muslim men who are non-citizens legally in the United States from countries in the middle east, I 
think their lives have changed a lot over the last ten years. I think the odds that they are on various 
government watch-lists, the odds that their neighbors look at them differently, the odds that for vari-
RXVUHDVRQVWKHLUUHFRUGVDUHSHUXVHGPRUHIUHTXHQWO\E\UDQGRPSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHRIÀFLDOVKDYH
all increased. Now this may be hard to prove, it may not offend most of  us, but I think it is still true. 
$QG,WKLQNLW·VZRUWKUHÁHFWLQJRQWKDW
Second. Even if  we worry about just we comfortable middle and upper middle class lawyers, 
I think there are relevant ways to worry about how that’s also changed over the past ten years. For 
example, before September 11th, it was against the law, there was a federal statute that made it a 
crime, it was in Title 18 of  the United States Code, to wiretap an individual without a court order. It 
was in 18 U.S.C. § 2511, you can go look it up. It was also a violation of  the federal telecommunica-
tions act for telecom providers to provide information about their callers and about their activities to 
the government without a court order. That was the law. And that is no longer the law thanks to the 
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FISA Amendments Act of  2008. In the process of  immunizing the telecom companies for whatever 
role they played in the wiretapping program, Congress also changed the law going forward, so that 
that would no longer be the case. 
Two other quick examples. Material witness detention. Before September 11th, there was one 
outlier example of  a case where the government had used the federal material witness statute to 
detain an individual in conjunction with an ongoing grand jury, as opposed to petty jury, proceeding. 
Since 9/11, there have been dozens of  reported examples, I can only imagine how many unreported 
examples there have been. And indeed, when a U.S. citizen who was held, in his view, pretextually 
XQGHUWKHPDWHULDOZLWQHVVVWDWXWHVXHGWRFKDOOHQJHLWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWVDLGQRLW·VÀQHEHFDXVH
pretext doesn’t matter. I think that’s a change in the law since what was true before 9/11.
Subway searches. I have a hard time believing that before September 11th, the U.S. Court of  
Appeals for the 2nd Circuit would have no problem whatsoever saying that random suspicionless 
searches of  passengers entering the New York City subway system does not violate the 4th Amend-
ment. Now, we all may be okay with the 2nd Circuit’s 2006 holding in MacWade vs. Kelly, 2006 U.S. 
App. Lexis 20587 (2nd Cir. 2006), that the those searches are in fact permissible and they are in fact 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO7KDW·VÀQH0\SRLQWLVMXVWWKDWWKHODZKDVFKDQJHGDQGVRZHVKRXOGDFWXDOO\WDNH
seriously the very real ways in which the law has changed as it relates to individual rights. 
All right. So that’s the sort of  past. What has been going forward? How does this relate to a con-
versation about the changing nature of  the terrorist threat? Well, one thought about a body that is in 
a particularly good position to balance the need for new tools and for new authorities with individual 
rights, is congress. And I think if  we spent a lot of  time talking about congress’ track record in this 
regard over the past decade, it would be a very one sided conversation. So I mentioned already the 
FISA Amendments Act. But let’s also talk about the actual scope of  the war on terrorism. Congress, 
in the authorization for the use of  military force passed on September 18th, actually gave a relatively 
XQGHUVWDQGDEOHVFRSHWRWKHFRQÁLFWLWZDVDXWKRUL]LQJ,WVD\VWKHSUHVHQFHDXWKRUL]HGWRXVHDOO
necessary and appropriate force against those persons, organizations or nations, I think, who are 
responsible for 9/11. There was a tie to 9/11. Now that things are getting a little bit more differenti-
DWHGQRZWKDWZH·UHWDONLQJDERXWDIÀOLDWHGJURXSVDQGFREHOOLJHUHQWJURXSVDQGHYHQWDQJHQWLDOO\
DIÀOLDWHGJURXSV7KHUH·VDKDUGTXHVWLRQDERXWZKHWKHUWKH\WRRDUHHQFRPSDVVHGZLWKLQWKHRULJL-
nal scope. 
Congress’ response is not to hold detailed hearings on how we think about the AUMF and how 
should we expand it and what authority does the administration need. Congress’ response is to tuck 
a very, very tiny provision into the National Defense Authorization Act, hold no hearings on it, and 
then just assume that no one is going to notice that by expanding the detention authority to include 
DQ\JURXSWKHSUHVLGHQWVD\VLVDIÀOLDWHGZLWKDO4DHGDLWLVDFWXDOO\H[WHQGLQJWKHVFRSHRI WKH
FRQÁLFW5LJKW",WKLQNWKDW·VDSUHWW\LPSRUWDQWWKLQJ&RQJUHVVUHOD[LQJSUH6HSWHPEHUWKEDUUL-
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ers. It’s generally true that the Constitution does not actually provide much in the way of  protection 
when it comes to privacy. In fact, before 9/11, most of  the key privacy protections, the laws that 
prevented businesses from talking to government, were statutory. Congress has relaxed those. Could 
congress reinstitute them? Sure. Will they? Well, I leave that to you. 
The Lone Wolf  Provision. In the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001, Congress, at the Bush adminis-
tration’s request, included authority to conduct certain kinds of  wiretaps and surveillance on lone 
ZROIV6RWKHVHDUHWHUURULVPVXVSHFWVZKRDUHQRWDWOHDVWFOHDUO\DIÀOLDWHGZLWKDQ\SDUWLFXODUWHU-
rorist organization. This was a critical power the Bush administration argued. When it expired, the 
Obama administration also said this a really important authority; we really need it. And Congress 
agreed and re-upped it again. Does any one know how many times the Lone Wolf  Provision has 
been used since 2001? If  it’s less than one, you’ve won your prize. Zero, that’s right. So my point is 
just that if  we’re going to have this long term conversation about the changing nature of  the terror-
ist threat, we should also be thinking about the other side of  the coin, which is that if  we’re going to 
have these new authorities, if  we’re going to have these new prerogatives, we should also think about 
whether we should be also designing ways of  insuring accountability.
Now, before I sort of  shut up and get yelled at by everybody else, let me just say, I don’t in any 
way mean to demean anyone who works on these issues from the executive branch position. I think 
it is entirely understandable. And I think it was entirely understandable, even during the Bush admin-
LVWUDWLRQWKDWH[HFXWLYHEUDQFKRIÀFLDOVZLOOSXVKWKHHQYHORSH7KDWWKH\ZLOOWDNHZKDWHYHUDXWKRU-
ity they have and use it to the best of  their ability to protect individuals and the country at large. And 
I think that is right. What we have to appreciate is that that’s going to be true and that even though, 
as a policy matter, certain administrations may come out looking better, the law still counts. And we 
still need legal restraints that are going to be enforced not just by the executive branch against them-
selves. So as the threat evolves over the next ten years, between now and September 11, 2021, I think 
we also have to worry about how our statutory protections or civil liberties are also going to evolve. 
Because otherwise, well, that’s a one-way ratchet. Thank you. 
DANIEL MARCUS: Thank you Steve. Maybe we ought to start by giving our government of-
ÀFLDOVKHUHDQRSSRUWXQLW\WRUHVSRQGWR3URIHVVRU9ODGHFN
STEVE VLADECK: But not Professor Anderson? [Laughter]
IVAN FONG: Well, I’ll do both. So just a comment or two in response, really, on Professor 
Anderson, not so much on the use of  force outside the U.S., but the very good and important ques-
WLRQ\RXUDLVHDERXWFRVWVDQGEHQHÀWVWKDWDGGLWLRQDOGROODUVVSHQWRQVRPHWKLQJWKDWPD\FRXQWHU
WHUURULVPRUVRPHRWKHUHYHQWYHUVXVWKHEHQHÀWWKDWZHREWDLQDVDVRFLHW\7KDWLVDTXHVWLRQWKDW
we think about a lot. We have a duty to be faithful stewards of  American taxpayer money; we are 
DFFRXQWDEOHWR&RQJUHVV:HDUHVXEMHFWWRVLJQLÀFDQWRYHUVLJKWE\DQXPEHURI ERGLHVDQGVRLI IRU
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QRWKLQJHOVH,WKLQNZHGRQ·WZDQWWREHZDVWLQJPRQH\ZHGRQ·WZDQWWREHFRVWLQHIÀFLHQW7KH
challenge, and I’ve actually tried to promote some interdisciplinary conversation here, is that as you 
IUDPHGLWLW·VGLIÀFXOWWRVSHFLI\RUDUWLFXODWHWKHWKLQJWKDWZHDUHEX\LQJDQGVROHWPHSURSRVHVRUW
of  a thought, and unfortunately I’m not an expert in this area, so maybe those of  you who are can 
take this farther. I have consulted with insurance law experts, because it seems to me that the analo-
gous area is spending money on insurance. You could argue that that’s wasted, because you never 
JHWWKHEHQHÀWRI LW7KHUH·VDQLPSRUWDQWGLVWLQFWLRQWKRXJK,QVXUDQFHNLFNVLQDIWHUVRPHQHJD-
tive event occurs, and doesn’t count on what I call prevention costs. And so we all have our own - I 
mean the hurricane is a great example. How much did you spend to mitigate the potential harm to 
or fortify whatever, your windows or whatever. All of  those costs also we go through in our own 
PLQGVDELWRI FRVWEHQHÀW$QGRIWHQZHPD\VD\ZHOODIWHUWKHHYHQWLI LWGLGQ·WKDSSHQWKDWZDVD
waste. But ex ante really you can’t say that. And it’s afterwards when there’s been some terrible thing, 
and people say, well you should have spent more, you could have done more. And those are very, in 
my view, unfair sorts of  perspectives because hindsight doesn’t take into account the risk that you 
perceived before hand. 
So the thought experiment that I try to invoke in these decisions is really spending money to 
buy down risk. We face a risk landscape. Our job is to evaluate and assess the highest risk. And we 
should be spending money in a cost effective way, buy down the highest risks and where it’s most 
cost effective. A dollar spent to reduce this risk from 10 units to 2 units is worth a lot more than 
spending of  the same dollar to reduce another risk from .3 to .299. Yet, those comparisons are easy 
to say in the abstract. In reality, should we spend more to prevent a nuclear WMD incident, a chemi-
FDODWWDFNDELRORJLFDODWWDFNDF\EHUDWWDFN"7KRVHDUHYHU\GLIÀFXOWDQG,FKDOOHQJHGRXUIULHQGV
DWWKH2IÀFHRI 0DQDJHPHQWDQG%XGJHW20%ZKRDOVRDVNWKHVHTXHVWLRQVWRVD\WKDWIRU\RX
economists in the room, there is a Nobel Prize in economics for the person who comes up with a 
theoretical framework for solving that kind of  equation. So, I just want to say, it is a good question, 
it is one we struggle with. It is one that I think conceptually we can understand in terms of  how we 
spend our money, but it’s very hard ex ante as opposed to ex-post to make those assessments.
With respect to civil liberties, you know I, of  course, take very seriously, and we do at DHS, our 
mission not only to help secure the homeland, but also to protect the rule of  law, privacy and civil 
rights. And I know you appreciate that there are a lot of  people who are doing that. The point about 
0XVOLP$PHULFDQVDQGWKH0XVOLPFRPPXQLW\LWLVDVLJQLÀFDQWHIIRUWDQGVXEMHFWRI RXWUHDFK
because those relationships are important. I would just distinguish between the impression you may 
get, which is I don’t believe there are the sort of  random suspicionless method of  sort of  perus-
LQJWKURXJKÀOHVDVRSSRVHGWRLQWHOOLJHQFHGULYHQVRUWRI ZHKDYHDSLHFHRI LQWHOOLJHQFHDERXW
a particular operative who may be traveling to the U.S. on a plane and the extent to which we can 
LGHQWLI\SHRSOHZKRÀWWKHVSHFLÀFSURÀOH$QGWKHQQRWUHDOO\GRDQ\WKLQJRWKHUWKDQVXEMHFWWKHP
to greater secondary screening is, I think, a way to balance what I think is an important and prudent 
approach of  being risk driven and intelligence driven with the sort of  broad brush. Everybody who 
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looks a certain way, I think we are very clear in our guidance and in the training that we give to state 
DQGORFDORIÀFLDOVWKDWLW·VYHU\LPSRUWDQWQRWWRVWHUHRW\SHRUHQJDJHLQUDFLDOSURÀOLQJ
The wiretap point you make, my familiarity with it actually isn’t that that the law has gone away, 
EXWLW·VEHHQDPHQGHGWRDOORZWKH$WWRUQH\*HQHUDOWRSHUVRQDOO\RUUHTXLUHDSHUVRQDOFHUWLÀFDWLRQ
before certain sharing of  information takes place. And so I think the answer isn’t so much that it’s a 
black and white prohibition, but that there are procedural safeguards in place. 
And then the last point, I will violently agree with you on the role of  Congress. [Laughter]. I 
think it has been, in my position now for a little over two years, the mainstay of  a lot of  what I do is 
GHDOZLWK&RQJUHVVDQGLWLVDYHU\GLIÀFXOWVLWXDWLRQ3DUWLFXODUO\JLYHQWKHQXPEHUVRPHRI \RXPD\
have seen, over a hundred congressional committees and subcommittees have oversight jurisdiction 
RYHUWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI +RPHODQG6HFXULW\$QGLWPDNHVLWYHU\GLIÀFXOWWRVD\WKHOHDVWWRQRW
only be responsive, but to have clear guidance as to what priorities Congress wants.
I’ll add one more piece, which I think is an important part, which is the third branch. The judi-
FLDU\KDVSOD\HGDVLJQLÀFDQWUROH:HDOONQRZWKDWWKHODZWKDWFRPHVGRZQIURPFRXUWFDVHVWHQGV
to lag. And so to some extent, of  course, they’re playing catch up and it makes it very hard when 
thinking about prevention and trying to lean forward in what we are doing. But the good news, or 
depending on our perspective I think, the news is that in general the government has been very suc-
cessful in the litigation in which things like the advanced imaging technology at the airports has been 
challenged on 4th Amendment grounds. An issue that we have had a bit of  discussion internally, is 
VHDUFKHVRI HOHFWURQLFPHGLDDWWKHERUGHU6RZKHQ\RXEULQJDODSWRSLQ\RXJHWDFRQÁXHQFHRI 
the government’s very clear and broad authority to search at the border versus what I think people 
YLHZDVDODSWRSEHLQJYHU\GLIIHUHQWIURPDÀOHFDELQHW<RXNQRZLI \RXZHUHZKHHOLQJDELJQRWH-
ERRNRUÀOHFDELQHWDFURVVWKHERUGHUWKHUHZRXOGEHQRTXHVWLRQWKDWWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWFRXOG
VHL]HZLWKRXWVXVSLFLRQLQVSHFWDQGVHL]H\RXUÀOHFDELQHW%XWDPHPRU\VWLFNRUDODSWRSPD\EH
VXIÀFLHQWO\GLIIHUHQWLQNLQGWKDWWKHFRXUWVZLOOFRPHGRZQGLIIHUHQWO\%XWWKDW·VWKHNLQGRI TXHV-
tion that I think ultimately the executive branch, Congress, and the courts need to come to some 
consensus on in order for all of  these issues to be sorted out. 
DANIEL MARCUS: John, do you want to add anything? 
JOHN CARLIN: As a law student, you tend to think abstractly about the legal framework and 
less about what goes into the day-to-day decision-making. I know from my time when I was at the 
FBI, it was a shock at how limited the resources were. And when you think about the entire bud-
JHWRI WKH)%,WKH\HDUO\EXGJHWLVVRPHZKHUHLQWKHRUGHURI ELOOLRQGROODUV7KHUHDUHURXJKO\
30,000 employees. That’s a big growth since 9/11. But when you consider the size of  the United 
States, and then the number of  FBI agents is roughly in the order of  14,000. So it doesn’t compare 
that well in some ways to large municipal police departments when you consider the scope of  the 
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responsibilities, not just in the counterterrorism or foreign intelligence realm, but civil rights and 
public corruption, violent crime and gangs, drug offenses, and bank robberies. The scope of  activ-
ity where the American public turns to the FBI and expects a solution is enormous compared to the 
resources. So what does that do to the day to day? That means every day you make a decision, or an 
agent makes a decision, on a particular case, or now that it’s Intelligence driven, that you analyze the 
threats in a particular domain or area of  the United States. You have to decide, where am I going to 
apply those extraordinarily scarce resources given the scope of  the population and the threats that 
we face?
And in that sense, the resource constraints, there’s a happy marriage between the resource 
constraints and those of  us looking at the civil rights and civil liberties concerns. Because it would 
be a terrible use of  those resources to randomly check large communities or attempt to randomly 
look at a U.S. person. Even if  you were allowed to do it, and you had the legal structure in place and 
authorities, which you do not, it would be a terrible use of  resources and instead, I think the day-to-
GD\FKDOOHQJHLVWKHRSSRVLWH,W·VÀJXULQJRXWKRZZHWULDJHWKHDUWLFXODEOHWKUHDWVWKDWZH·UHUHFHLY-
ing day in and day out, and decide of  this vast volume of  threats from the threat matrix of  terrible 
acts that we’re hearing chatter about, which one of  these are the ones that are most likely to become 
operational and where we should apply our scarce resources? And that is a decision that is extraor-
GLQDULO\GLIÀFXOWWRJHWULJKWDQGLVRQHWKDW,WKLQNKDVEHHQNH\DQGUHDOO\WKHFRUQHUVWRQHRI WKH
FBI’s transformation over the last ten years. Which is, we have these intelligence analysts, we share 
the intelligence, we receive the intelligence, now how do we make those decisions on the application 
of  resources to disrupt. It goes to the risk analysis that Ivan was discussing. 
Just on one - the Lone Wolf  Provision. It’s one that has garnered a lot of  attention, perhaps 
because of  the name. It’s ironic to me a little bit that it’s used as an example of  a violation of  civil 
rights and civil liberties since, as the professor stated, it’s never been used. So in that sense, we can 
breathe a sigh of  relief  that you have not been targeted. But it is an authority that if  it were used, it 
really goes to whether or not you could plead out that an individual was linked to a particular iden-
WLÀDEOHWHUURULVWJURXS6RWKHFRQFHUQLV\RX·OOKDYHDQLQFLGHQWZKHUH\RXFDQPDNHWKHVKRZLQJ
and it does require a showing, to Article III judges in court, in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, that you could make the showing that an individual falls within your foreign intelligence au-
thorities. But you couldn’t show that they were linked to a particular group. It’s called the Moussaoui 
problem and thankfully it’s not one that’s been confronted, but the thought was it was good to have 
the authority. If  we did use it, it’s one where the - it also goes from the FBI to the National Security 
Division, the application would have to be approved. It then goes to the court, the court would have 
to approve it, and then after it was used, you’d have to report its use back to Congress.
So I think there are areas where receiving additional guidance or clarity from Congress would be 
appreciated. I’m not sure if  Lone Wolf  is, although it’s important I think to plan for that possible 
eventuality, I think it’s probably received too much attention.
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STEVE VLADECK: Although in that sense, right, it might just be that it’s a metaphor? And 
that the metaphor is - I mean this is after the point I was trying to make and I think both of  your 
responses helpfully illustrates it. Which is that from the perspective of  the executive branch, the 
position rightly is we haven’t used these authorities and therefore there is nothing to worry about. 
We have been faithful, we have not crossed these lines, we are not doing random stuff  because of  
resource constraints or other reasons. And from my crazy academic perspective, that’s wonderful, 
but it’s a political constraint, not a legal one. It’s a constraint that is only as good as the circumstanc-
es that allow it to exist.
As the threat evolves over time, and as things change and as there are new crises, the fact that 
these authorities are out there, whether or not they’ve been used, is what gives me pause and is what 
I think we should be addressing. To paraphrase Justice Jackson, it’s the loaded weapon. Responsible 
H[HFXWLYHEUDQFKRIÀFHUVZLOORQO\VKRRWWKHORDGHGZHDSRQZKHQWKH\KDYHWREXWP\FRQFHUQLV
about making sure we understand when the weapon is there.
IVAN FONG: If I could also just reply. I think you may underestimate the power of  the state-
PHQWE\WKHVHQLRUOHJDORIÀFLDOVLQWKHGHSDUWPHQWWKDWVRPHWKLQJLVXQODZIXO6RLI \RXUSRLQWLV
that, do we prosecute people or do we not indemnify them when they cross the line? That I will 
leave to others, but I can tell you from personal experience, that I wouldn’t even call it pressure, I 
think there is a sense of  shared mission. That people come to these agencies because they are dedi-
cated to the mission. When I do recruiting or when I meet the lawyers, I often ask them, why did 
you come to work for DHS? And maybe I shouldn’t be surprised, but at least in the beginning I was 
very surprised that a very common answer, maybe in more than half  the occasions, people would 
say, “9/11 affected me in ways that I can’t describe and I resolved to myself  that I wanted to do 
something about it and I’m a lawyer, so I applied for a job at DHS, and here I am.” 
Everyday when we respond to various crisis and people work late into the evening, overnight, 
over the weekends to respond to hurricanes, earthquakes, I see that everyday. And the point is really 
not that we’re so blinded by the mission that we ignore the rule of  law. But that people do take seri-
ously, and I can’t go into the internal deliberations, but there are many - it is the rule, not the excep-
tion, that the lawyers will say, I’m sorry you’re about to cross the line or if  you were to go there, it 
ZRXOGUDLVHVLJQLÀFDQWOLWLJDWLRQULVN$QGLI ZHH[SODLQWRWKHPZKDWWKDWULVNLVDQGZK\ZHZLOO
KHOSWKHPÀQGDPXFKEHWWHUSDWKWRDFFRPSOLVKZKDWWKH\ZDQWWRGR6R\RXPD\FDOOLWSROLWLFDO,
view it as the shadow of  the law. I mean this is what happens everyday in the executive branch where 
lawyers are giving advice and people who are policy makers or operators actually follow the advice. 
It’s the very rare occasion, and sometimes you do hear about when people go above or behind or 
beside the lawyers and they’re the ones that get in trouble. And we are very fond of  pointing that out 
to people. 
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STEVE VLADECK: So we’re going to have the Libya conversation next week? [Laughter]
DANIEL MARCUS: The problem sometimes of  course is that the legal advice, as we saw argu-
ably some years ago with respect to torture, may not have been the correct advice. But I agree with 
Ivan that there is great effort to preserve the rule of  law within the executive branch, but of  course 
the legal advice has to be the right advice. 
We’ve run out of  time. I would like to - and everyone should feel free to leave - do you have to 
OHDYH"<RXKDYHDERXWÀYHPLQXWHV"$OOULJKW,ZRXOGOLNHWRJLYHDQRSSRUWXQLW\IRUSHRSOHWRDVN
questions, and I sure have a couple. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Over the past ten years it seems that the U.S. has looked to certain 
events in its foreign capacity only as to how they relate to its foreign policies, i.e. the United States 
has seemed to really look at how the death of  Bin Laden will change what our Afghanistan policy 
should be without changing our Iraq policy. I don’t see any evidence that the domestic agencies have 
done the same kind of  analysis about the real scope of  this threat and that instead you have a kind 
of  rhetorical conversation between the World Trade Center, 9/11 and the threat of  home grown ex-
tremists. They don’t seem equivalent to me, in any respect, and, which is not to say that they’re not, 
that it’s not serious, but they’re not equivalent. The 9/11 Commission recommendations were about 
what could we have done and what wasn’t done to prevent the next kind of  massive attack from 
overseas? And you’ve done a lot of  things that we’ve asked, but now, you’re talking about something 
internally, and it seems to me that the government has to failed to do the same. For instance, in 
having 72 Fusion Centers when I think the likelihood of  a massive terrorist attack, I hope, is pretty 
low. The costs in terms of  an increase in government power and authority, which is there to be used 
when times get tough and the next administration is tempted to use it and the costs, of  course, in 
terms of  money, when we have - I mean every dollar is not only a question of  which FBI agent is 
going to what, but which food stamp program is going to get cut because the security apparatus is 
so large? And lastly, it is not clear to me that there has really been an analysis of  the effectiveness of  
the changes in domestic counterterrorism landscape in preventing domestic incidents. And it’s reas-
suring that there have been so few, but it doesn’t prove that what you’ve been doing is correct. And 
that analysis simply hasn’t been done. 
DANIEL MARCUS: Who wants to take that on? [Laughter]
JOHN CARLIN: In terms of  the threat posed by home grown violent extremists and how 
seriously it should be taken by the FBI, the Department of  Justice, and Department of  Homeland 
Security, I do think this is an area where you look to the executive branches accountable ultimately to 
the people. Listen carefully to our oversight from the hill, and I throw it back a little bit on what are 
the expectations and what is the task? So currently I think it’s very clear that the number one priority 
is to prevent terrorist attacks, regardless of  the perpetrator, inside the United States. That is also the 
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number one priority of  the Department of  Justice. Clearly, and that includes both international ter-
rorists and domestic terrorists and it certainly includes homegrown violent extremists. I think many 
of  us remember Oklahoma City and the type of  damage that was caused in that case by a violent 
extremist who was a domestic terrorist. And I think if  we’ve seen some of  the domestic response to 
a couple of  events over the past two years. The tragic loss of  life at Fort Hood and the failed at-
tempt to blow up an airliner by Abdulmutallab. And the reaction and response that we received in 
my former seat at the FBI, indicated expectations were high. That it was unacceptable to come that 
near to a success in the case of  Abdulmutallab. I think similar criticism in Times Square. And in Fort 
Hood it was unacceptable that any attack had occurred at all. There was an extensive investigation by 
multiple congressional committees. there was a White House driven interagency extensive investiga-
WLRQDVWRZKDWKDGJRQHZURQJDQGZKDWFRXOGEHÀ[HG$QGWKHPHVVDJHZDVFOHDUWKDWDOWKRXJKLW
may be impossible to assure 100 percent safety from a terrorist attack, that that is and should remain 
our goal. And that every day we should be doing everything we can within our existing authorities, 
ever mindful of  our obligation to the rule of  law and civil liberties to prevent those attacks from oc-
curring. 
It is not up, I don’t think, to the - it’s important for the executive branch agencies such as the 
FBI and the Department of  Justice and DHS, to attempt to execute according to their authorities 
and the expectations until told otherwise. And so, that will remain our number one goal. I won’t give 
my personal opinion as to whether we should attempt to stop home grown violent extremists from 
committing terrorist attacks inside the United States ranging from shooting up pedestrian malls or 
along the line of  what we saw in Mumbai, or using improvised explosive devices, but I will say that 
currently, that’s our goal and our drive each day, is to prevent that from occurring and I certainly 
don’t think that’s outside the bounds of  what we should be doing.
DANIEL MARCUS: You want to add anything quickly?
IVAN FONG: I want to add a couple of  points. I wanted to mention or respond to this point 
about countering violent extremism and this distinction between home grown and foreign. I think 
those concepts are elusive. I think there are important differences to be sure, but we are increasingly 
seeing an evolution of  the threat so that the border is making less of  a difference. I think John al-
luded to the frequency with which we see the Internet being a medium for communication and that 
the transnational nature of  some of  the operations. So I would hesitate to say that they are com-
pletely different, not am I saying that they are identical. I think they share some similarities and that I 
think it’s important to treat it as spectrum as opposed to two distinct categories. 
I also want to say that the increase in authorities I think does result from the evolving threat. 
That as the threat evolves, as the landscape changes, the folks that are tasked everyday to prevent 
and to deter, need to have different authorities. We engage in that very public debate, for example, 
in the cyber security arena, where because of  the evolving threat, I think you have seen both the 
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administration and others propose legislation to clarify some of  the authorities. 
The last point to respond to, this very important question that’s been a bit of  a theme, has it 
been worth it? I saw a statistic the other day. The DHS budget is about 3.5 percent of  the overall 
federal budget. I leave it to you to decide whether that’s too much, too little, you know, enough, not 
enough. But I think we sometimes have this impression that we are spending an inordinate amount 
of  money. We are spending a lot of  money, don’t get me wrong, but we are also spending money in 
lots of  other very important priorities that this country has and to me, I’ll interject my own personal 
view. 3.5 percent doesn’t strike me as being unduly high. 
DANIEL MARCUS: Okay. I think, while I know there are more questions, and I have some 
questions, I think we really have run out of  time and people have to leave. So I’m going to call it 
quits. Thank you everyone for coming and please join me in thanking our exceptional panel. 
[Applause]
